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Cost and Profit
INTRODUCTORY
Theories about cost and profit
Changes in costs and profits per unit of goods sold have been
thought an important factor in the generation of business cycles
(Ch. 3). Various analysts of business have believed that a rise in
unit cost occurs in many industries during the later stages of ex-
pansion, and that it contributes to the eventual onset of depres-
sion. They hold that declines in unit cost during contraction are
common and help to bring about a revival of business. Advocates
of 'purchasing power' doctrines, on the other hand, assert that
expanding industrial production is typically accompanied by
falling unit cost (at least if wage rates do not change), and infer
that increases in wages or reductions in prices are not only a
feasible but a necessary means of stimulating expansion and
avoiding contraction.
In this chapter we shall try to learn what kind of changes in
unit costs and profits have actually occurred in the railway
industry.Of course the railroads are only one sector of private
business, and whatever may be true of them is not necessarily
true elsewhere. But they have resemblances to other industries
that are pertinent to the problem. It is obvious from foregoing
chapters that cyclical fluctuations in the physical volume of
business have an important bearing on railway costs; and there
is good reason to suspect that volume is similarly important in
many other industries.
What the terms mean
Cost and profit are not self-defining expressions. We shall take
the former to mean what, in the standard accounting rules pre-
scribed by the ICC, is called railway operating expenses. They
miscellaneousitems. (Expenses charged to investment rather
than to current operations, however, are not included.) As usually
presented, they include also depreciation—almost entirely de-
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preciation of equipment.' Finally, they include loss of and damage
to the property of shippers and the public, personal injury pay-
ments, and insurance. On the other hand, operating expenses do
not include taxes, rents for the use of equipment or railroad
property owned by others, or interest on indebtedness.
Railway profits are computed in various ways, with varying
results. In the standard system of accounts the difference between
operating revenues from all sources (freight, passenger, mail,
express, dining car, etc.) and operating expenses is called net
revenue from railway operations.It does not all go to the owners
of the railroads, as dividends or as increase in the value of their
equity. On the contrary, net operating revenue, together with
some income from other sources than operations, is shared with
the government, the owners of rented equipment and property,
and the holders of railway indebtedness. Sometimes, when all
these other claimants have been provided for, what remains to
the stockholders is a minus quantity.
Taxes chargeable to operations are deducted from net revenue
to arrive at a second level of profit called railway operating income.
Equal to operating revenues minus expenses and taxes, it repre-
sents the return from operations to property interests of all kinds
after allowance for the government's claims.
Rents becoming payable for the use of rolling stock and joint
facilities (such as a station owned by one railroad but used by
another also), minus rents receivable on these accounts, are de-
ducted from operating income to compute a third kind of profits,
net railway operating income. It is equal to operating revenues
minus operating expenses, rents, and taxes.
Since the three kinds of operating profit are defined in terms of
successive subtractions, net revenue usually exceeds operating
income, and net operating income is the smallest of all. Once in a
rare while, however, accounting readjustments result in minus
entries for taxes or rents and reverse this natural order for a
month or two.
Depreciation
The inclusion of depreciation in operating expense as usually
computed and published affects the meaning of the figures. The
'In the period covered by thisstudy,it was not customary to depreciate road, or
fixed structures, and charges to expenses on their account were small.COST AND PROFIT 269
Table94
Summary of Methods by which Depreciation was Estimated
As illustrated in Table 95, Part I
As illustrated in Table 95, Part II
As illustrated in Table 95, Part III
Sum of estimates described below
One-half of difference between total for
1933 and total of figure for last 10
months, seasonally adjusted
Actual figures, seasonally adjusted
Freight Cars
July 1920—December 1932
Method of Table 95, Part III, applied to
annual totals for locomotives instead of
to those for all property
As illustrated for freight cars in Table 96f
All Other
July 1920—December 1932
f The number of locomotives assigned to switching is not known. We assumed it
varied in proportion to the number of locomotives assigned to road passenger and
freight service. Annual depreciation on all locomotives was divided by this number
to get the mid-year charge per locomotive. The consequent exaggeration of the
latter was offset in the monthly estimate, since the unit charge was multiplied by
a correspondingly understated number of locomotives.
Kind of property, and period
I
Method










As illustrated in Table 96
Method of Table 95, Part III, applied to
annual totals for all other
aggregate depreciation charge depends solely on the dollar value
of the stock of depreciable property and the percentage rates
applied to it. Current operations have no effect except as they lead
to acquisitions or retirements. In preceding chapters we have
shown that the number of vehicles does not increase or diminish
in proportion to traffic. Their aggregate ledger value also must be
stable. The rates applied to the latter probably do not change very
much. Consequently, the aggregate charge cannot vary closely
with traffic—is unlikely to rise or fall as much in a few months or
even a few years. Depreciation per traffic unit is therefore likely
to fall sharply as the volume of business rises and vice versa—a
quasi-automatic result of the accounting rules, which require a
charge of so much per dollar of investment per month, whether
cars and locomotives are used intensively or sparingly. If depre-
ciation were a specified amount per mile run, the charge per unit
of traffic would behave in a quite different manner. As matters
stand, cost per unit, including depreciation, must fluctuate some-270 CHAPTER 10
Table 95
Computation of Estimated Depreciation





(a) Year ended June 30, 1913 ICC 64,463
(b)Yearended June 30, 1914 ICC 77,188
(c) Middle month of 1912—13 (a)÷ 12 5,372
(d) Middlemonth of 1913—14 (b) ÷12 6,432
(e)Increase (d) —Cc) 1,060
(f)Increase per half month (e) ÷ 24 44
January 1913 (c) + (f) 5,416
February 1913 (c) + 3 x (f) 5,504
December 1913 (c) + 23 x (f) 6,384
II
(a) Year ended June 30, 1916 ICC 93,255
(b) Calendar year 1916 ICC 98,289
(c) Middle month of 1915—16 (a) ÷ 12 7,771
(d) Middle month of calendar year 1916 (b) ÷ 12 8,191
(e) Increase (d) —Cc) 420
(f)Increase per half month (e) ÷ 12 35
January 1916 (c) + (f) 7,806
February 1916 (c) + 3 X (f) 7,876
June 1916 (c) + 11 x (f) 8,156
III
(a) Calendar year 1918 ICC 113,027
(b) Calendar year 1919 Icc 121,360
(c) Middle month of 1918 (a) ÷ 12 9,419
(d) Middle month of 1919 12 10,113
(e) Increase (d) —Cc) 694
(f)Increase per half month (e) ÷ 24 29
July 1918 (c) + (f) 9,448
August 1918 (c) + 3 X (f) 9,506
June 1919 (c) + 23 X (f) 10,086
what differently than cost excluding it. Since deduction of oper-
ating expense is the first step in computing any kind of profit, the
latter also must be affected. We think it desirable to analyze
both cost and profit before as well as after depreciation. Tjnfortu-
nately we cannot do this with entire accuracy, since the deprecia-
tion charged monthly was not reported to and by the ICC for
any period before March 1933. For earlier months we are obliged to
estimate it by methods of varying crudity, which are summarizedCOST AND PROFIT 271
in Table 94 and illustrated in Tables 95 and 96. Whatever their
defects, we feel confident that the figures they produce can seldom
differ by more than 2 or 3 percent from the grand total of those
entered in railway accounts.
Table 96
Computation of Estimated Depreciation of Freight Cars
July 1925 and June 1926
Basic Data for Calendar Year 1925
(a) Aggregate depreciation of freight cars ICC $107,389,000
(b)Freightcar monthsa ICC 28,415,000
(c) Depreciation per car, middle month (a) ÷ (b) $3.779
Basic Data for Calendar Year 19536
(d) Aggregate depreciation of freight cars ICC $111,274,000
(e) Freight car monthsa ICC 28,330,000
(f) Depreciation per car, middle month (d) ± (e) $3.928
(g) Change from 1925 in depreciation per car (f) —(c) $0.149
(h)Changeper half month (g) ÷ 24 $0.006
Estimate for July 1925
(i) Depreciation per car (c) + (h) $3.785
(j) Number of freight cars owned ICC" 2,371,000
(k) Aggregate depreciation (i) X (j) $8,974,000
Estimate for June 1926
(1) Depreciation per car (c) + 23 X (h) $3.017
(m) Number of freight cars owned ICC" 2,363,000
(n) Aggregate depreciation (1) X (m) $9,256,000
Total of 12 monthly figures (January to December) for number of cars.
bSeasonallyadjusted by NBER.
OPERATING EXPENSES
Lower unit cost at peaks than at troughs in traffic
When traffic grows, more men go to work on the railroads and the
companies augment their consumption of fuels, materials, and
supplies. If sellers of commodities used in transportation did not
change their prices and if no new wage rates were negotiated,
aggregate expense would increase in expansion and fall in contrac-
tion. Actually, changes in prices usually re-enforce the effect on
expenses of fluctuations in traffic, although the course of wage
rates is less regular (Ch. 9). Aggregate charges have increased in
every expansion, diminished in every contraction except 1918—19
(Chart 104). The low and high points in expense were seldom
reached at exactly the same time as those in traffic. In 12 of 17












Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units.
CHART 104
Railway Operating Expenses, July 1907—December 1940
Million dollars
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or to decline after it began to revive; in 2 others (1918 and 1919),
we recognize no turn in expenses. Aggregate costs were neverthe-
less higher at every peak than at the preceding trough, lower at
every trough except March 1919 than at the preceding peak. This
was also true of annual expenses before 1908—10 (Chart 105).
CHART 105














Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units
Someof the intervals between the turns in traffic and those in
expense were short. In others the difference between the level of
expense at its own turn and at that in traffic was slight. Between
the traffic trough of 1932 and the expense trough of 1933 the
general direction of change in both was similar—they rose for a
few months, then fell again—although traffic finished higher,
expense lower than it started. In two instances, however, growth
of expense after the recession in traffic was both sharp and pro-
longed; for other reasons as well, these turns invite special com-
ment.
When wages were raised in 1918, the awards included back pay
at the new rates from January 1 onward. The accounts for earlier
months, however, were apparently closed, and much of the back
pay was charged to expenses in June. Consequently the curve274 CHAPTER 10
shows a needle-like upward projection in that month. In July it
falls back, then resumes the less hectic rising movement it dis-
plays before June. We prefer to disregard the transient extreme
level created by a peculiar accounting necessity. As no other
month is outstanding, we do not designate any peak in this
vicinity. In any case, there was a substantial increase in operating
expense after the traffic peak in May.
A similar needle in August 1920 has a similar explanation.
Wage increases retroactive to May 1 were announced on July 25;
but apparently, in large part at least, the back payments were
recorded in the expense accounts for August. In this case, how-
ever, there obviously would have been a peak somewhere in the
neighborhood even if the accounting complication had not oc-
curred. No other month looks more likely than August, which we
have accordingly marked; There can be no doubt that the high
point would have been reached considerably later than the traffic
peak in February—perhaps in August, perhaps as late as Novem-
ber. Moreover, the excesses over the February level of expense
are substantial.
But in view of the main problems we have set before ourselves
in this chapter, variations in aggregate cost have merely an intro-
ductory interest. That it should rise and fall more or less with
volume is not surprising; we want to know what happens to the
average cost of rendering a unit of transportation service. To
answer this, question we must divide aggregate expenses by traffic
units.
After doing so, month by month, we find that every expansion
of traffic can be paired with a corresponding fall in cost per traffic
unit, and every contraction with a corresponding rise (Chart 106) •2
Sometimesthe change in traffic and the opposite movement of
unit cost began or ended at about the same time. In other cases,
there was a difference at one .end or the other—noticeably during
the first World War, when cost began to rise at the end of 1915
although traffic did not reach a peak until May 1918.
Although the direction of change in unit costs was reversed
during many phases in traffic, in six of eight traffic expansions
they were lower at the end than at the beginning. With one
partial excluding depreciation in 1929—32—
2Weignore an 'extra' phase in unit cost during 1932—37.0
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Table 97
Operating Expenses per Traffic Unit
Averages for Stages of Cycles in Traffic Units, 1908—1938
(Cents)
____________________
Cyclc,& kind II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
1908—li
II .53915381 L.5299 .5494.5664.5752 5869 11.5876.5782
1911—14
I .5620.5625.5702.5620 L.5391 .572211.5758 .5757.5633
II .5782.5785.5865.5787 L.5556.5906.596711.5992.5885
1914_19b
I .5633 L.5297.5383.6103.6539.7487 .8346 .9033 11.9495
II .5885 L.5537.5611.6326.6746.7707 .8581 .9283 H.9765
1919_21b
I .9495.9305 L.8690 .9459.9452 1.06311.1035H1.1732 1.1437
II .9765.9565 L.8944 .9726.9702 1.09041.1318111.2104 1.1830
1921—24
I 1.1437 1.0295 1.0274.9786 L.9015 .939111.9690 .9232.9453
II 1.1830 1.0676 1.06501.0115 L.9319.9711111.0047 .9596.9849
1924—27
I .9453.9053.8787.8618 L.8413.8519 .8590 .8697 11.8772
II .9849.9441 .9177.9002 L.8789.8903 .8994 .9124 11.9212
1927—32
I .8772.8534 L.8238 .8245.8278 11.8426.8364.8389.8058
II .9212.8964 L.8656 .8660.8694.8893 .8919 11.9072.8827
1932—38
I .8058.7237.7306.7021 L.6546 .6854 .728111.7512.7495
II .8827.7880.7902.7529 L.6975 .7298 .7792 .8108 11.8113
Hindicates a high, L a iow stage. Level of any stage not marked (except I, which
is ignored because it is identical with IX of preceding cycle) is intermediate.
Lines numbered I pertain to expenses excluding, and those numbered II to
expenses including, depreciation.
b The retroactive wage increases included in the accounts for June 1918 and August
1920 badly distort the reported figures for these months. In computing the averages
for stages V and VI of 1914—19 and VII of 1919—21 we substituted hypothetical
figures. Unable to ascertain the amount of the retroactive charges, we assumed
that in their absence aggregate expenses including depreciation would have
equaled the average of May and July 1918 in June 1918, and the average of July
and September 1920 in August 1920. From the hypothetical totals we deducted
depreciation to arrive at hypothetical expenses excluding depreciation. The four
aggregates thus determined were then divided by traffic units in the usual manner.
they were higher attheend of each contraction than at its be-
ginning (Table 97). If the experience of enterprises in other
industries was like that of the railroad industry, cost per unit ofCOST AND PROFIT 277
sales at the beginning of a majority of contractions in the output
of those industries was lower than unit cost at the preceding
trough. And the cost situation was almost invariably worse at the
dawn of recovery than at the preceding onset of depression.
CHART 107













Shaded periods are contractioPs in traffic units.
Annualdata pertaining to five phases before 1908—10 present a
somewhat different picture. Unit cost did fall, to be sure, in the
two expansions—but it fell in two contractions also, rising only
in 1907—08 (Chart 107). However, in the 1895—96 expansion the
decline was more rapid than in 1893—95 or 1896—97; and the de-
cline in 1897—1907 contrasts with the rise in 1907—08. Three of
four comparisons suggest inverse conformity of unit cost to traffic.
On the other hand, the net decrease over the long expansion
from 1897 to 1907 proceeded at aa average rate of
cents per year, less rapid than in 1896—97 (.0062 cents). Its year
to year course was very irregular: a fall to 1900, a rise to 1904
(most rapid after 1902), another fall to 1906, a small rise to 1907.
The Babson ton-mile estimates and the fluctuations in the annual
expensemight show an accelerated decline in the latter during an
expansion from 1897 to 1903, a rise during a contraction from 1903278 CHAPTER
to 1904, and a net fall from 1904 to 1907. The inverse conformity
would then appear unbroken from 1893 to 1908.
Is the end of expansion foreshadowed by rising costs?
Even though there is net improvement, from a managerial point
of view, over an expansion as a whole, it may be concentrated in
the earlier stages, and the situation may deteriorate toward the
end. A late upward trend of costs may be discouraging to invest-
ment and business, whether or not it carries cost above the level
that prevailed in the beginning. The expansion of 1927—29 il-
lustrates such a state of affairs. Costs fell at first, then rose (Table
97). Conversely, even when unit expense increases over a contrac-
tion as a whole the rise might occur entirely during the early
stages; later, it might be succeeded by a decline, which would be
encouraging to business even if it did not bring unit cost all the
way down to the level that prevailed at the end of prosperity.
CEART 108
Number of Months by which Turn in Operating Expenses
(including Depreciation) per Traffic Unit Preceded (—)or
Followed (+) Turn of Opposite Character in Traffic Units
Turn
traffic un(ts
































Ifwe were to consider oniy the dates of peaks and troughs, we
would be led to conclude that unit cost commonly does rise in the
latter part of an expansion, and falls in the latter part of a con-
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traction. In 11 of 17 cases, a trough in cost preceded a peak in
traffic units, or a peak in cost preceded a trough in traffic (Chart
108). The turns coincided in 4 instances; twice, cost continued to
decline up to and after a peak in traffic.
But an economic activity or ratio, as we have noticed before,
does not always change in a fairly consistent direction after it has
reached its turning point. No one, to be sure, could deny that
cost on the whole rose during the last two-thirds of the 1914—18,
or the last half of the 1919—20 expansion. On the other hand, in
1923—24, although unit expense declined after October 1923, it
turned up again before the contraction was over. In some of the
cases in which the turning points in cost preceded those in traffic
the interval was only 2 or 3 months. To avoid the danger of resting
on the outstanding position of a single month or on
short we may again resort to a device employed in pre-
ceding chapters—we may examiTle the progressive changes in
averages for the groups of months we call stages (Table 97).
Approaching the question in this way produces a somewhat
different impression. In 4 of 8 expansions, the lowest cost, in-
cluding depreciation, was reached in the fifth or final stage. If we
had figures excluding depreciation in the earliest cycle, the score
for this variant of cost would be at least as high; for, with the
1911—13 phase missing, it is 4 of 7. On either basis, costs were most
favorable to management when traffic was at its highest level,
in at least half of the cases. The averages for stages suggest that
while in some expansions costs behave in accordance with the
theory previously described, in others nothing of the kind occurs;
and that neither type of expansion is appreciably more common
than the other. I.n contractions, on the other hand, cost excluding
depreciation was highest at the end stage in only two of the seven,
and cost including depreciation in only 3 of the 8 end stages for
which there are data. In a fair majority of instances unit expense
did begin to decline before the shrinkage of traffic ended. The low
stage in costs never came afterthehigh stage in traffic, nor the
high stage in costs after the trough stage in traffic. (Later figures
indicate that cost declined after the 1938 trough.)
It may be worth noting, moreover, that the changes in later
segments were, on the whole, less uniform in direction than those
in the first (Table 98). Unit cost including depreciation, to be280 CHAPTER 10
sure, increased in the second as well as the first segment of every
contraction; but it fell in one of the third and in half of the fourth
segments.
Table 98
Number of Segments of Cycles in Traffic Units in which Unit Cost
Increased and Number in which it Decreased




Increase 1 3 3 2 7 6 5 3
Decrease 6 4 4 5 0 1 2 4
mci. depreciation
Increase 1 3 4 3 8 8 7 4
Decrease 7 5 4 5 0 0 1 4
Most rapid fall, or rise, came early
The data presented in preceding sections suggest that, under
comparable conditions as to morale of labor, quality of fuel and
materials, efficiency of management, prices and wage rates paid, a
large volume of traffic would always be accompanied by a unit
cost lower than that which would accompany a smaller volume.
If so, a substantial rise in traffic might be accompanied by some
fall in cost despite unfavorable changes in the other factors men-
tioned. And a fall in traffic might bring a rise in unit costs despite
favorable changes in those other factors. The effect of volume
could mask that of morale, etc. But if the situation in these re-
spects deteriorates more rapidly in later than in earlier stages of
expansion, and improves more rapidly in later stages of contrac-
tion, one might suppose that the fall in costs in the former, and
the rise in the latter, would at least be retarded. From this point
of view one would expect cost in the later segments of an expan-
sion either to rise or to fall less rapidly than in the earlier seg-
ments. In later segments of a contraction one would expect either a
fall in cost or a less rapid rise than in the earlier segments.
These expectations are more or less in accordance with the data
(Table 99). In 5 of 8 expansions the most rapid fall in unit cost
occurred during the first segment, in 2 others it occurred during
the second. In every one of our 8 contractions, the most rapid
rise came in the first segment.COST AND PROFIT 281
The tendency of cost to fall at a diminished rate, or even to
rise, as expansion progresses, and to rise at a diminished rate, or
even to fall as contraction proceeds, was most noticeable in the
second segment. As we pass from the second to the third, or the
third to the fourth segment, we find it in a narrower majority of
our 8 cycles, or even in a minority (Table 100).
Table 99
Operating Expenses per Traffic Unit
Change per Month during Segments of Cycles in Traffic Units, 1908—1938
(Cents per month)
Cycle, & Segment of expansion Segment of contraction
kind of
________________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
expense5 First SecondThird Fourth First Second Third Fourth
1908—11
ii —.0002—.0012.0028.0042.0044 .0033.0002 —.0047
1911—14
I .0001.0010 — .0011—.0057.0083 .0005 —.0000b — .0031
[i .0001.0011 — .0010 — .0058.0088 .0009.0004— .0027
1914—19
I — .0048 .0006 .0053 .0062.0474 .0286.0229 .0231
II — .0050 .0005 .0053 .0060.0480 .0291.0234 .0241
1919—21
I — .0095 — .0176.0220 — .0004.0393 .0073.0127— .0098
II — .0100 — .0177.0223 — .0012.0401 .0075.0143— .0091
1921—24
I — .0286 — .0003 — .0075 — .0193.0150 .0066 — .0102 .0088
II — .0288 — .0004 — .0082 — .0199.0157 .0075 — .0100 .0101
1924—27
I — .0089 — .0033 — .0021 — .0046.0035 .0013.0019 .0025
II — .0091 — .0033 — .0022—.0047.0038 .0017.0024 .0029
1927—32
I —..0068—.0046.0001.0009.0023 —.0005.0002— .0051
II —.0071 — .0047 .0001.0010.0031 .0002.0013—.0038
1932—38
—:o1551:oooif— —
Computedfrom data in Table 97. -
Lines numbered I pertain to expenses excluding, and those numbered II to
expenses including, depreciat.ion.
s..
Certainlythe changes in cost toward the very end of expansion
bore little resemblance to the sharp rises so characteristic of the
first segment of contraction (Table 99).In5instancesthe rising
costs in the latter succeeded falling costs in the last segment of282 CHAPTER 10
expansion. In the other 3, although cost was already rising before
the turning stage the rate of rise was accelerated after it. The
effect on cost of the passage from contraction to expansion was
almost equally marked. In 3 cases rising costs in the last segment
of contraction were followed by falling costs in segment one of
expansion. In 3 others, a decline that had already begun was
accelerated. We find only 1 instance (there are 7 in all) of any-
thing else: a fall, then a rise in 1911.
Table 100
Unit Cost: Summary of Changes from Segment to Segment of Phases in
Traffic Units
Number of expansions in which unit cost:
In second segment, rose, or fell less rapidly than in first
In third segment, rose, or fell less rapidly than in second




Number of contractions in which unit cost:
In second segment, fell, or rose less rapidly than in first
In third segment, fell, or rose less rapidly than in second




Derived from Table 99.
Conclusions similar for traffic and reference cycles
The reasoning that leads to the expectation of rising costs in late
expansion and falling costs in late contraction applies in some
respects to cycles in business at large rather than to those in the
output of specific industries. Our files contain data on the relative
levels of unit operating expense including depreciation during
stages of the Burns-Mitchell reference phases, and on relative
rates of change during segments of those phases. The conclusions
to which they lead are similar, on the whole, to those we have
drawn from the traffic-cycle averages. There was a net fall in cost
during 5 of 8 reference expansions, a net rise in 7 of 8 contractions.
The direction of change was more consistent in early than in late
segments, but there was no consistent reversal of direction (Table
101). The most rapid change in the characteristic direction came
early. The tendency of change to reverse itself or taper off, how-
ever, was somewhat more persistent in reference than in traffic
Computations based on reference cycles are less pertinent to the problems dis-
cussed in the following sections, and are therefore not presented.COST AND PROFIT 283
Equal changes in traffic accompanied by larger changes in cost in
earlier stages
The foregoing discussion suggests that the influence of changes in
other factors did not modify that of changes in volume in apy
very consistent manner toward the end of phases. But traffic
itself does not rise (or fall) by the same amount per month in
every stage, and uneven changes in volume may explain the lack
of consistency. Instead of dividing the change in unit expense by
the time elapsed during a segment we may divide it by the change
in traffic units. Such computations tell us whether the changes in
cost that corresponded to successive equal increments of traffic
followed any consistent pattern.
Table 101
Operating Expenses, including Depreciation, per Traffic Unit
Change during Segments of Reference Cycles
Segment of expansion Segment of contraction
FirstSecond Third FourthFirstSecond Third Fourth
Number of cycles for which
data are available 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9
Number in which unit cost:
Fell 7 4 5 4 0 0 5 4
Did not change 1 0 0 ,0 0 1 1 1
Rose 0 4 3 4 8 8 3 4
Fellmore rapidly than in any
other segment of same
expansion 5 1 1 1
Rose more rapidly than in
any other segment of same
contractiona 5b 1 0 jb
Rose,or fell less rapidly than
in preceding segment of
same expansion 7 5 7
Fell, or rose less rapidly than
segment of
same contraction ... 9 5
aSincethere are no data on the first segment of the 1907—08 contraction, only 8,
not 9, comparisons are possible.
bInaddition, rate of rise was same in first and fourth, but higher than in second
or third segment of 1910—11.
The outcome, m a way,LS
calculations. In all expansions except one, the fail in unit cost,
per billion units of growth in traffic, was greatest in either the
first or the second segment; and in all contractions the rise in unitTable 102
Operating Expenses per Traffic Unit
Change per Billion-unit Change in Aggregate Traffic Units during
Segments of Cycles in Traffic Units
(Cents)
Table 103
Unit Cost: Change per Billion-unit Change in Traffic
Summary of Comparisons between Segments of Cycles in Traffic Units
Number of expansions in which change in unit cost, per billion-unit
increase in traffic:
In second segment, was a rise, or a smaller fall than in first 6(of8)
In third segment, was a rise, or a smaller fall than in second 4(of7)
In fourth segment, was a rise, or a smaller fall than in third 3(of7)
Number of contractions in which change in unit cost, per billion-unit .
decrease in traffic:
In second segment, was a fall, or a smaller rise than in first 6(of8)
In third segment, was a fall, or a smaller rise than in second 6(of7)
In fourth segment, was a fall, or a smaller rise than in third 6(of7)
Derived from Table 102
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Lines numbered I pertain to expenses excluding, and those numbered II to
expenses including depreciation.
bTrafficdiminished. °Trafficincreased.COST AND PROFIT 285
cost, per billion units of traffic lost, was greatest in one or the
other of the first two segments (Table 102).
Evidence of tapering off in expansion once more emerges less
frequently from later measurements. In contractions, however,
falling costs, or smaller rises per billion units of traffic shrinkage,
were at least as common in the third and fourth segments as in
the second (Table 103).
Effect of depreciation
The foregoing sections reveal little difference between cost ex-
cluding and including depreciation. The addition of an allowance
for the gradual consumption of durable items of investment did,





















Shadedperiods are contractions in traffic units.
Aggregatedepreciation wasinsensitiveto cyclical influences.
The annual charges rose continuously from 1911 to 1930, declined
to 1933, then rose again except for a very slight dip in 1936 (Chart
109). The monthly figures in our worksheets convey practically286 CRAPTER 10
the same impression (before 1933 this is a more or less automatic
consequence of our methods of estimate).Contraction did not
consistently retard the rate of growth, nor, for that matter, did it
quicken the increase. Comparisonsof adj oining phases indicate
inverses conformity in oniy a slight majority of cases (Table 104).
Table 104
Aggregate Depreciation
Change per Month between Peaks and Troughs in Traffic Units,
1911—1938
expansions than in contractions of traffic, depreciation per traffic
unit was likely to grow less rapidly or fall when. the volume of
business was rising, and to increase when it was shrinking. And
in fact the charge per unit fell in every expansion but one (1911—
13), rose in every contraction (Chart 110).
The percentage increase in the unit allowance for wear and tear
was greater than that in other unit expense during every contrac-
tion except 1918—19(Table 105). Consequently, cost including
depreciation rose by a greater percentage, in all except one in-
Turn in traffic units
Date Level




































































































































a Three-monthaverage; date of
b Bycomparison with preceding
turn is middle month.
rate; e.g., 72 with 49..
Since aggregate depreciationdid not regularly grow faster inCHART lit)








Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units.288 CHAPTER 10
stance, than cost before an allowance for wear and tear was
added. In expansions, however., the results of such comparisons
vary from cycle to cycle. In 1919—20, 1921—23, and 1932—37
depreciation fell more than other costs; consequently, expense
including it fell by a greater percentage than expense excluding
it. But in 1924—26 and 1927—29 a lesser fall in depreciation than
in other costs reduced the fall in the inclusive total. An actual rise
in unit depreciation had a similar effect in 1911—13.
Table 105
Depreciation and Operating Expenses, per Traffic Unit
Percentage Net Change during Phases of Cycles in Traffic Units,
1911—1938




Excluding depreciation —4.0716.08 —0.45 —21.18 —11.00 —5.63 —18.76






Computedfrom three-month averages for peaks and troughs in traffic units.
Averagesfor expenses are shown in Table 97.
On the other hand, in the one expansion in which cost before
depreciation increased (1914—18), a fall in depreciation resulted
in a smaller rise in inclusive than in exclusive costs. In 4 of 7
expansions, therefore, depreciation acted in the way one would
expect an element of cost inflexible in the aggregate to act.
Furthermore, the ratio of depreciation to total cost, and hence to
other costs, conformed inversely to traffic in all comparisons of
adjoining phases (Table 106). Although it increased in 1911—13,
1924—26, and 1927—29, the rise was less rapid than in the neigh-
boring contractions. Apparently other than cyclical influences
tended to enhance the relative importance of depreciation in both
kinds of phase. They opposed the effect of rising and intensified
that of falling traffic. It is difficult to tell what they were, but had
they not been present, it seems likely that unit depreciation would
have fallen by a greater percentage than other unit costs in theseCOST AND PROFIT 289
expansions too. The growth of traffic was small, and
other influences could therefore more easily predominate. Traffic
units increased 22 percent in 191 1—13, 19 percent in 1924—26, and
only 8 percent in 1927—29, whereas in 1921—23 and 1932—37, when
depreciation did fall more than other costs, the increases in volume
were 40 and 80 percent respectively.
Table 106
Ratio of Depreciation to Operating Expenses including Depreciation
Change per Month between Peaks and Troughs in Traffic Units,
1911—1938
Turn in traffic units Change from preceding date
Months Per month
from Ratios
Date Level Total peak trough
from from
trough peak
Mar. 1911 Trough .. .0280
Feb. 1913 Peak 23 .0298 .0018 .0001
Dec.1914 Trough 22 .0428 .0130... .0006
May 1918 Peak 41 .0278 —.0150—.0004
Mar. 1919 Trough 0 .0276 —.0002 ... — .0000b
Feb. 1920 Peak 1 .0258 —.0018 —.0002
July 1921 Trough .1 .0332 .0074 ... .0004
Apr. 1923 Peak 21 .0327 —.0005 —.0000b
June 1924 Trough 14 .0402 .0075... .0005
July 1926 Peak 25 .0427 .0025 .0001
Dec. 1927 Trough 17 .0478 .0051 ... .0003
Aug. 1929 Peak 20 .0479 .0001 .0000c
Aug. 1932 Trough 36 .0871 .0392 ... .0011
Mar. 1937 Peak 55 .0615 —.0256 —.0005
May 1938 Trough 14 .0761 .0146 ... .0010
a Three-month average; date of turn is middle month.
bNegativebut greater (algebraically) than —.00005.
o Positive but less than .00005.
The practice of including depreciation might be expected not
oniy to widen the amplitude of fluctuations in unit cost but also
to postpone its turning points or high and low st.ages. Since the
aggregate clìarge alters rather slowly and evenly, on a per unit
basis it should decline up to the end of an expansion and rise up
to the end of a contraction. This was, more or less, what happened
(Chart. 110). As previously noted, the direction of change in other
costs, on the contrary, was not infrequently reversed during a
phase. In fact, however, the turning points in the two variants of
cost were identical, and so, with one exception, were the high and290 CHAPTER 10
lowstages (Table 97). This negative finding may be attributed to
the relatively small importance of depreciation; even at the deep
trough of August 1932 it was oniy 8.71 percent of all costs, and
usually the percentage was considerably lower (Table 106). The
exception accorded with the theoretical expectation. In 1913—14
cost before additions for consumption of capital equipment
reached its highest level in stage VII, but, because of the con-
tinued growth of unit depreciation, cost including it was highest
one stage later (Table 97).
Physical relations usually more important than prices paid
All operating costs may be conceived of as charges for commodities
and services used in the performance of transportation. Aggregate
costs are the sum of the expenses for these various items. Further-
more, one may think of the total charge for any one item as the
product of an average price and the quantity of the item used.
Thus expense for hourly labor may be regarded as the product of
average hourly earnings and the number of hours paid for; cost of
locomotive fuel as the average price per ton multiplied by the
tonnage consumed. The conception may seem a little fanciful if
carried rigorously through the whole range of railway outlays.
Payments for accidental personal injuries of any specified kind,
for example, would have to be thought of as the product of the
average price for an injury of that type and the number of in-
juries. Nevertheless, in the main the idea makes sense.
With enough data it would be possible to compute for any
period the cost per traffic unit of a'ny kind of commodity or service.
It would be equal to the total cost for the item divided by the
amount of traffic. This in turn would be equal to the price of the
item, multiplied by the quantity used per unit of traffic. Costs of
all kinds per traffic unit would be equal to the sum of such prod-
ucts for all items. If we designate the quantities of the several
items by q1, q2,q3, etc.,their prices by Pi, P2, and so forth, and the
number of traffic units bythen total cost per traffic unit would
equal
++COST ANfl PROFIT 291
Here the q/titemsvary inversely with physical If one
rises, the amount of some article or service used per traffic unit
has increased—productivity of the item in terms of traffic has
diminished. The p items represent wage rates and prices paid.
If there were a general rise in the q/t's from the beginning of a
phase to the end, and no change in prices, total cost per traffic
unit would rise. It would also rise if there were a general increase
in the p items, with no change in the q/t's. Conversely, general
improvements in efficiency would, by themselves, cause total
cost per unit to fall, and so would general declines in prices. In
fact, the change in unit costs during a phase is probably the net
upshot of many somewhat conflicting changes in the individual
factors. Some efficiencies improve, others deteriorate, and prices
move diversely. Nevertheless it is often possible to form some
judgment as to the preponderant direction of changes in effi-
ciencies and in prices—or more exactly, rates of payment—and
as to the relative importance of the two groups of factors.
In preceding chapters we have shown that the productivity of
labor and fuel tends to rise in expansion and fall in contraction;
in other words, that the important q/t's pertaining to them tend
to fall in the former and rise in the latter. Changes in physical
relations between traffic and these goods and services tend to
reduce unit cost when traffic is growing and to increase it when
traffic is dwindling. It seems likely that this is true of physical
relations in the aggregate, especially since these two items ac-
count for about 70 percent of operating expenses excluding de-
preciation (Table 88, col. 8, Sec. B). On the other hand, as we
have shown in Chapter 9, wage rates and prices rose in most
expansions, although it is not clear that their combined total
usually fell in contractions. Consequently, the influence of changes
in physical relations on. unit cost has usually opposed that of
incontractions. When they are opposed, is one commonly stronger
than the other?
Since unit costs fell in 5 of 8 expansions it seems reasonable to
that rn. cases were more
'Efficiency' in a purely mechanical sense. It could deteriorate, a.s a result of
diminishing traffic or other circumstances, in spite of increased diligence and in-
telligence on the part of management or workers.292 CHAPTER 10
thanprices, etc. Two of the remaining phases, 1915—18 and 1919—
20, were periods of sharp general rises in prices—indeed the only
violently inflationary expansions covered by our data. In a serious
inflation, therefore, the relative strength of the two sets of in-
fluences is likely to be reversed.
As we cannot tell in most contractions whether thefactors
(including wage rates as well as prices) rose or fell on the whole,
we can hardly tell whether their influence opposed that of deterio-
rating physical relations. But since unit costs rose in all contrac-
tions we can say with confidence that either the changes in price
and wage factors reenforced those in physical factors or the former
were not strong enough to prevail over the latter. In the great
1929—32 contraction we know there was a net fall in average
hourly earnings as well as in prices; since unit cost nevertheless
rose, it is clear that in this case declines in efficiency were more
important than declines in rates of payment.
The foregoing remarks apply somewhat more realistically to
cost excluding than to cost including depreciation. For in the
latter case some of the pq/t's represent depreciation on various
kinds of property. 'Quantity' would have to mean, for example,
the number of freight cars used up, which, is assumed by account-
ing convention to be virtually independent of fluctuations in the
movement of equipment. 'Price' would mean the average value
at which the rolling stock was originally entered on the books,
which would often have little relation to current quotations.
Consequently, fluctuations in this element of cost during any
phase do not represent changes in quantities of goods physically
and observably consumed or fluctuations in prices during that
phase.
The effect of the accounting procedure is to make the factors
in this kind of cost behave rather like, those in other expenses.
The quantity of equipment implicitly deemed to be used up, per
unit of traffic, declines in expansion and rises in contraction. The
quasi-prices are virtually averages of prices paid during the life,
to date, of the oldest existing equipment, and changes in such
averages during any one phase must be very mild. It seems un-
likely that they conform either positively or inversely to traffic.
But the quasi-physical input-output relations are the importantly
variable factor, and they work toward inverse conformity of unitCOST AND PROFIT 293
costs. The three elements of cost—labor, road fuel, and deprecia-
tion—for which we know that the input-output relations are of
this character comprise from 70 to 75 percent of all operating
expenses including depreciation (Table 88, col. 8, Sec. C).
TAXES
Aggregate taxes positively related to traffic
Of the income left after payment for labor and materials and
charges for depreciation, the railroad companies must contribute a
large fraction to federal, state, and local governments. Some of
the most important kinds of taxes are billed to them oniy once a
year, or are levied on the business of a year as a whole. But if
railway accountants are to prepare monthly statements of net
earnings, they must allow something every month for payments
to the government. For payroll taxes this does not present much
of a problem. Taxable wages can be ascertained after the close of
each month, but before the accounts for that month are prepared,
and the rates applied to them. Property, income, and some less
important taxes, however, make trouble. A fraction of an annual
sum must be apportioned to each month although the total can-
not be determined accurately until the year has ended. Assessors
may change the valuation of property or legislators the rate ap-
plicable to it. Income taxes present an even harder problem;
earnings for a year are much more difficult to predict than the
probable valuation of property. The amount of profit is uncertain
as well as the rate of tax, which may change after the beginning
or even the end of the year. For example, the federal corporate
income tax rate applicable to 1921 was not enacted until Novem-
ber 23. The act of February 26, 1926 raised the rate applicable to
1925 income from (the rate which prevailed in 1924) to 13
percent. For these and other reasons, monthly ta.x accruals near
the beginning of a year are very crude guesses. As the months go
by, fuller information becomes available. It looks as though the
accountants tend to be pessimistic about the size of the tax
burden to be imposed on their companies, for in the figures
before seasonal adjustment, accruals usually decline steeply in
November and December. Apparently the rate of accrual on the
books is cut sharply to make up for over-allowances earlier inCOST AND PROFIT 295
the year. Our process of seasonal adjustment greatly reduces
these year-end corrections, but since they vary erratically from
year to year, even the seasonally adjusted data we present in
Chart 111 show an occasional dagger-like projection. At times,
when the year-end revision was small, or involved raising instead
of lowering expectations, the dagger points upward. Special
circumstances may occasionally lead to wild fluctuations. Chang-
ing prospects concerning the necessity for ultimate payment of
retirement taxes seem to account for the sharp increase in ag-
gregate taxes at the end of 1936, and certainly explain the down-
ward-pointing needle in June 1937.
Table 107
Railway Tax Accruals
Change per Month between Peaks and Troughs in Traffic Units,
1908—1038
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$7,000,000, at the end $33,000,000. The main reason, of course,
was the tremendous broadening of the functions of government.
The rise in the general level of salaries and prices, however, would
probably have led to a more rapid rise in railway taxes than in
traffic, even if there had been no broadening of functions.
Partly because of erratic adjustments and partly because of
rising trend we feel unable to mark off cyclical peaks and troughs
in taxes. Consequently, we cannot say that taxes vary in cycles
corresponding to those in traffic units. But we can determine
whether they conform to the cycles in traffic. They rose in every
expansion, but rose in three contractions also, remained unchanged
in one, and declined in four. Even when they rose in contraction,
however, they never did so as rapidly as in the adjacent expan-
sions. There was complete positive conformity from 1908 onward
(Table 107).
Cyclical differences among kinds of
This regular relationship is the upshot of variations in the several
types of impost, which have dissimilar fluctuations. Available
statistics permit us to divide them, over a long period, into three
maj or classes: federal taxes (except those on payrolls), state taxes
(except those on payrolls but including imposts levied by towns,
counties, and other political subdivisions), and payroll taxes. As
there are no monthly data on these individual categories until the
1930's, we must confine our examination to annual figures.
Before the federal government imposed a corporate income tax
in 1909 (then called an excise), practically all railway contribu-
tions were paid to the states and their subdivisions. Despite the
later growth of federal and payroll levies, state taxes remained
larger than the others (Chart
Except for slight declines from 1895 to 1896 and from 1914 to
1915, state taxes increased every year from 1890 to 1930 (Charts
112, 113). They grew not oniy in every expansion except 1932—37,
but also in every contraction except 1929—32. Our usual method
of computation indicates little conformity to cycles in traffic.
Eleven comparisons suggest inverse, seven positive conformity
(Table 108). It is not likely that monthly figures would yield a
more consistent score. For state taxes are composed largely of
Data, except for federal taxes 1913—16, pertain to Class I line-haul roads.COST ANDPROFIT 297
property taxes (Table 109),6 and neither the rates nor the valua-
tion change from month to month. Charges in the income ac-
counts represent merely a distribution by railway accountants of
annual levies.
CHART 112
State, Federal, and Payroll Taxes, 1911—1939
Million dollars
It should not be inferred from the poor showing of conformity
that state lawmakers and assessors are wholly unresponsive to
business conditions or changes in the fortunes of the railroads.
Of the two interruptions in the period of growth ending in 1930,
6I)atasimilar to those in the table are not available for more recent years than
1916. However, the Bureau of Railway Economics made a special study (Railway
Taxalion, Washington, D. C., 1934) in which it obtained "nearly complete" data
for 1930 or 1931 pertaining to 41 states and the District of Columbia. It found that
taxes on rolling stock and other property amounted to 83 percent of all the state
taxes reported.
1910'12'14'16'18'20'22'24'26'28'30
Shadedperiods are contractions in traffic units.298 CHAPTER 10
one coincided with the last year of a contraction in business
and revenue. After 1930 state taxes declined sharply; the de-
cline continued past the 1933 trough in income through 1935.
Although the following rise continued not oniy through the peak
year 1937 but also through the depression year 1938, taxes turned
downward slightly in 1939. The legislative and administrative
processes necessary for revision are slow. By the time action can
be taken, the occasion for it, except as a matter of retroactive
justice, may have passed. Thus a brief and mild contraction may
bring no adjustment, while a severe and prolonged decline may
eventually lighten the burden. Once rates and valuations have
been reduced, some time may elapse before they are again revised
upward
113
Railway Tax Accruals, 1890—1911
Milliondollars
110





Shadedperiods are contractions in traffic units.
The continuation from 1932to 1935of the decline that began after 1930should
probablynotbe interpretedmerely as a delayed governmental response tothe
contractionof 1929—32. In the first place, therewereminor declinesintraffic during
the early years of the 1932—37 expansion. In the second, after contraction gave way
to intermittent expansion it became clearer that the railroads were suffering from
something more than business depression, namely, a loss of competitive position.
The readjuatments after 1932 may represent increasing recognition of this fact
by the fiscal authorities.COST
Table 108
State Taxes
Change per Year between Peaks and Troughs in Traffic Units,
1893—1938




prec. Total To To




1893 Peak .. 35.1
1895 Trough 2 38.1 3.0 ... 1.5
1896 Peak 1 38.0 —0.1 —0.1
1897 Trough 1 41.1 3.1 ... 3.1
1907 Peak 10 73.7 32.6 3.3
1908 Trough 1 78.7 5.0 ... 5.0
1913 Peak 5 117.9f 39.2 7.8
1915 Trough 2 134.2t 16.3 ... 8.2
1913 Peak .. 113.7
1915 Trough 2 129.6 15.9 ... 8.0
1918 Peak 3.5 70.9 41.3 11.8
1919 Trough 1 91.8 20.9 ... 20.9
1920 Peak 1 232.3 40.5 40.5
1921 Trough 1 238.6 6.3 ... 6.3
1923 Peak 2 254.9 16.3 8.2
1924 Trough 1 267.0 12.1 ... 12.1
1926 Peak 2 280.7 13.7 6.8
1928 Trough 2 301.4 20.7 ... 10.4
1929 Peak 1 307.2 5.8 5.8
1932 Trough 3 263.2 —44.0 ... —14.7
1937 Peak 5 217.9 —45.3 —9.1
1938 Trough 1 219.2 1.3 ... 1.3
Figures in the 1893—1915 section pertain to all line-haulroads. All taxesassumed
to be state taxes, 1893—1908.
Figures in the 1913—38 section pertain to Class I line-haul roads only. Small
amountspaid to foreign governments or not allocable by taxing jurisdictions
included, 1918—38.
f Estimated by applying to total for Classes I and II the ratio, in 1912 (1.0065),
of (I + II + III) to (I + II).
On the other hand, the sharp fluctuations in feal taxes con
formed positively to cycles in traffic. Since they began to be
important they have always risen in expansion and fallen in
contraction.8 The marked and regular fluctuation reflects the pre-
QommaIlceincome taxes (Table 110). All other types were a
small part of the total even in years when income tax accruals were
8Satisfactorydata on federal taxes of Class I roads alone are not available before
calendar year 1916. Accordingly, those shown on Chart 112 pertain to all line-haul
roads. Since traffic of the latter did not contract in 1911 we present no data for
years before 1911. None of the earlier figures exceeded $5,000,000.300 CHAPTER10
low.Total federal taxes therefore fluctuate in much the same way
as income taxes. But the base on which the latter are imposed of
course rises and falls with profits, which, as we shall demonstrate,
are usually related positively to the volume of railway business.
Table 109
State Taxes, Property and Total, 1901—1916 (thousands of dollars)
Ad valorem real & Total taxes and %property
Year ended June 30 personal property assessments (1)± (2) X 100
(1) (2) (3)
1901 34,575 49,726 69.5
1902 37,337 53,193 70.2
1903 40,120 57,798 69.4
1904 43,410 61,658 70.4
1905 46,159 63,325 72.9
1906 54,261 74,602 72.7
1907 60,586 80,108 75.6
1908 64,702 84,564 76.5
1909 70,778 90,334 78.4
1910 78,176 99,423 78.6
1911 72,935 94,080 77.5
1912 82,797 104,803 79.0
1913 87,901 113,661 77.3
1914 99,488 130,795 76.1
1915 102,216 129,618 78.9
1916 109,928 139,559 78.8
Allroads,1901—08; allline-haul roads, 1909—10; Class I line-haul roads, 1911—16.
Table 110
Federal Taxes, 1933—1942 (millions of dollars)
Year 1933 1934 1935 193& 1937 1938 1940j 1942
Incometaxes 12.7 14.3 18.9 30.7 32.0 18.9 32.8 59.9 173.8755.1
Allotherfederal taxest6.65.55.85.05.13.54.15.111.41 24.5
Total federal taxesf 19.3 19.8 24.7 35.7 37.1 22.4 36.9 65.0
Class I line-haul railways.
tExceptpayroll taxes.
Itis too early to examine statistically the cyclical variation
in payroll taxes. They did not exist at the beginning of the 1932—37
expansion. The first attempt to provide funds for the retirement
of elderly railroad workers was a levy of 4 percent on payrolls,
effective August 1, 1934. Some companies, if not all, entered such
taxes in the accounts from that month through March 1935. But
early in May the law was declared unconstitutional; minus entriesCOST AND PROFIT 301
were made for April and other months of On January 1, 1936
railroads, like other employers, became subject to a tax of 1 per-
cent, the proceeds of which were to be used for unemployment
compensation. Beginning March 1 a new retirement tax was im-
posed. Although the railways contested this law also in the courts,
and made few actual payments under it, accruals jumped. On
January 1, 1937 the employment tax became 2 percent.
During the contraction of 1937—38 social security imposts were
still in flux. Taxes at the rate ofpercent on 1936 payrolls were
forgiven, and so were those in excess ofpercent on 1937 wages,
which became the rate under superseding legislation. The remis-
sions led to large negative accruals in the June 1937 accounts. On
January 1, 1938 the unemployment tax rose to 3 percent.
Since the traffic trough in 1938 there have been further changes.
The retirement levy rose to 3 percent in 1940,in 1943,in
1946,in 1947. It is to be 6 percent in 1949 andafter 1951.
The unemployment tax, however, has remained at 3 percent.'°
Unless the rates are revised by new laws, total payroll taxes due
from the railroads will amount to approximatelypercent of
wages. They will regularly rise and fall with traffic, as total wages
do, and should fluctuate by a smaller percentage than other fed-
eral taxes, since payrolls are less unstable than profits.
gNeitherthe tentative accruals nor the reversals got into the annually reported
totals. Consequently no payroll taxes are shown for 1934 or 1935 on Chart 112.
Sourcesof information on payroll taxes:
For retirement: Railroad Retirement Act of 1934, approved June 27, Section 5.
Railroad Retirement Board et at. vs. Alton Railroad Company et at., decided May 6,
1935 (295 US 330). An Act to Levy an Excise Tax on Carriers and an Income Tax
on their Employees, and for other Purposes, approved August 29, 1935, Section 4.
Carriers Taxing Act of 1937, approved June 29, Section 11. Annual Report, Rail-
road Retirement Board, 1940, p.13; 1941, p.138; 1944, p. 13; and itsMonthly Review,
Aug. 1946, p. 128. Public Law 572, approved July 31, 1046.
For unemployment: Social Security Act, approved August 14, 1935, title IX.
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (transferring administration of unemploy-
ment benefits for railroad workers from the Social Security Board and the states
to the Retirement Board), approved June 25, 1938. Annual Report, Secretary of the
Treasury, 1938, pp. 171—2; 1939, p. 157. Annual Report, Railroad Retirement Board,
as above.
Under all the retirement legislation, taxes at the same rates were levied on
workers, except that under the 1934 law they were required to pay only 2 percent.
Under the Social Security Act any excess over $3,000peremployee per year,
and under the retirement and railroad unemployment laws any over $300 per
month, was not taxed.302 CHAPTER 10
Taxes less variable than traffic
Although taxes always rose with traffic, more often than not the
rise in the former was less rapid than that in the latter. In 6 of 8
expansions for which we have monthly figures, there was a net
decline in taxes per traffic unit (Table 111), although the change
during the phase was often quite irregular (Chart 110). In the
other 2, the rise was less rapid than in the neighboring contrac-
tions. And although taxes sometimes fell with volume, they never
fell as much. In the 4 contractions in which aggregate taxes de-
clined, the reduction did not equal the fall in traffic; taxes per
unit rose anyway. In the 3 contractions in which aggregate taxes
increased and in the one in which they were unchanged, taxes
per traffic unit of course increased. On the whole there was less
cyclical variation in the contribution of the railroads to govern-
ment than in the movement of freight and passengers.
Annual figures for cycles before 1908—11 point to a similar con-
Table 111
Railway Tax Accruals per Traffic Unit
Change per Month between Peaks and Troughs in Traffic Units,
1908-1938
Turn in traffic units Change from preceding date
Months Taxes Per mouth
from per
prec. traffic T T Date Level date unita Total eak trough
Prom from
trough peak
June 1908 Trough .0311
Apr. 1910 Peak .0305 —.0006
Mar. 1911 Trough .0325 .0020
Feb. 1913 Peak .0315 —.0010
Dec. 1914 Trough .0385 .0070
May 1918 Peak .0351 —.0034
Mar. 1919 Trough 10 .0427 .0076 ... .0008
Feb. 1920 Peak 11 .0481 .0054 .0005
July 1921 Trough 17 .0750 .0269 ... .0016
Apr. 1923 Peak .0637 —.0113
June 1924 Trough .0751 .0114
July 1926 Peak .0748 —.0003
Dec. 1927 Trough 17 .0761 .0013 •.. .0001
Aug. 1929 Peak 20 .0770 .0009 .0000b
Aug. 1932 Trough 36 .1045 .0275 ... .0008
Mar. 1937 Peak .0774 —.0271
May 1938 Trough .1015 .0241
Three-month average; date of turn is middle month.
bPositivebut less than .00005.COST AND PROFIT 303
clusiori (Chart 114). The unit burden of taxes was lightened in
every expansion, became heavier in every contraction from 1893
to 1908.
CHART 114







Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units.
EQTJIPMENTAND JOINT FACILITY RENTS
Whattheyare
A railroad company ordinarily uses some freight cars which it
does not own, in addition to those it does. To avoid the expense
and delay of transferring goods from car to car, it was arranged
long ago that a carlot shipment destined for transportation over
more than one road should normally go through to its final des-
tination in the vehicle into which it was initially loaded. Some-
times a car belonging to the railroad on which the shipment
originates is used, sometimes a 'foreign' car which the originatiiig
must others
astandard daily rent for the use of their cars on its lines.h1 Much
traffic, however, moves in equipment that does not belong to any
railroad, but to shippers or to enterprises that make a business of
cars.
twoor more railroads.) The railways must pay for the use of these
"-FromNovember 1, 1920 through January 31, 1945, this 'per diem' charge was one
dollar per car per day. 268 ICC 659, 664.304 CHAPTER 10
freight cars also, usually a specified amount per mile of travel.
Less frequently, a railroad uses passenger cars or locomotives be-
longing to others. Payments for the use of rolling stock are called
equipment rents •12
Inmany places two or more railroad companies make joint use
of fixed facilities. Often one of the users is also the owner. For ex-
ample, the New Haven operates trains into and out of New York
City over tracks and through stations owned and used by the New
York Central. Payments to the owner are called joint facility
rents 13
Rentspayable by Class I railways go partly to other Class I
lines, partly to railroads not in the Class I category, and partly to
nonrailroad owners such as the private car companies. Our figures
are net; in their computation receipts by Class I from Class I
cancel payments by Class I to Class I. The national totals rep-
resent the excess of payments by Class I to non-Class I roads and
to private owners over receipts from the same two sources. On a
monthly basis they are not available before January 1917.
Rents less variable than traffic
From then until 1931 aggregate charges rose fairly steadily, and
few if any cycles corresponding to those in traffic are readily dis-
cernible (Chart 115). There was a net rise in every expansion,
however, and a net fall in three contractions, 1918—19, 1929—32,
and 1937—38. In two, 1923—24 and 1926—27, the rise was less rapid
than in the neighboring expansions. Only in 1920—21 did rents
rise more rapidly than in the adjoining phases (Table 112). On
the whole aggregate rents conformed positively to the cycles in
traffic.
But they tended to fluctuate less than the volume of railway
business. In every contraction except 1918—19, there was a readily
apparent rise in rent per traffic unit (Chart 110). There was a net
fall in three of five expansions (Table 113). Although aggregate
rent conformed positively to traffic, rent per traffic unit conformed
inversely, with one exception.
12Paymentsfor the use of equipment leased for a year or longer are not included.
13Theuniform system of accounts draws a distinction between the amounts that
cover a share of the expense incurred by the owner in operating the facilities and
amounts that may be regarded as pure rent. The former are included in operating
expenses of the lessor-user, and only the latter in the figures discussed here,COST AND 305
The tendency of unit rent to vary inversely with physical
volume is largely explained by changes in the composition of the
latter. More rent is paid for freight cars than for fixed facilities
and other equipment; and most of the freight car rent is paid for
equipment used to carry perishable foodstuffs or petroleum and
its products. In 1942 (there are no figures for earlier years) owners
of cars rented to railroads received $75,000,000 for the use of re-
frigerator cars, $73,000,000 for petroleum and tank cars (an ab-
normally high figure, however), and only $7,000,000 for all other
freight cars. Both kinds of traffic tend to grow less in expansions
and diminish less in contractions than freight traffic in general.
Fluctuations in the movement of the cars containing them, and
in the payments made for their use, must likewise be mild. When
aggregate rents, most of which are paid in connection with perish-
ables and oil, are divided by total traffic units, the charge per unit
is likely to be related inversely to cycles in aggregate traffic.
CHART 115













Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units.
•,.'.
pansionreduced the figure as much as the preceding contraction
raised it. At every peak since 1918, it exceeded its level at the
preceding peak. Changes in the composition of traffic help to ex-
plain this feature of its history also. Except from 1918 to 1920,Table 112
Aggregate Equipment and JointFacilityRents
Change per Month between Peaks and Troughs in Traffic Units,
1918—1938.





prec. neak trough Date Level date Irom from
trough peak
(millions of dollars)
May 1918 Peak .. 3.62
Mar. 1919 Trough 10 2.92 —.70 ... — .07
Feb. 1920 Peak 11 4.14 1.22 .11
July 1921 Trough 17 6.69 2.55 ... .15
Apr. 1923 Peak 21 7.90 1.21 .06
June 1924 Trough 14 7.94 .04 ... .OOb
July 1926 Peak 13 9.52 1.58 .12
Dec. 1927 Trough 17 9.53 .01 ... .OOb
Aug. 1929 Peak 20 10.18 .65 .03
Aug. 1932 Trough 36 9.95 —.23 ... — .01
Mar.1937 Peak 55 10.89 .94 .02
May 1938 Trough 14 10.76 —.13 ... — .01
a Three-monthaverage; date of turn is middle month.
bPositivebut Less than .005 million dollars.
Table 113
Equipment and Joint Facility Rents per Traffic Unit
Change per Month between Peaks and Troughs in Traffic Units,
1918—1938




































































































a Three-monthaverage; date of turn is middle month.
bPositivebut less than .00005.
Negative but greater (algebraically) than —.00005.
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the ratio of fruits and vegetables to all tonnage increased some-
what from each peak to the next. Again with an exception from
1918 to 1920, the relative importance of packing house products
has not diminished much from one to another (Chart 17). Oil
traffic, about as large at the beginning as the two foodstuffs com-
bined, has steadily gained in relative position, rising from 1.8
percent of all tons originated in 1918 to 5.8 percent in 1937 (Chart
18). Tonnage of these commodities, considered as a group, was
growing more rapidly than that of all traffic, and the payments so
distinctively associated with them were likely to increase more
rapidly.
OPERATING PROFITS
Heavy traffic, high profits
As we have âhown, unit cost was usually lower when traffic was
at its highest level than when it was lowest. The first variant of
profit, net revenue, is computed by deducting cost from operating
revenue. If operating revenue per traffic unit had never changed,
unit profit before taxes and rents would usually have been higher
at traffic peaks than at troughs.
Actually, as noted in Chapter 9, there was often a net fall in
unit operating revenue during an expansion, a net rise during a
contraction. The changes in average 'price' tended to offset those
in cost. But in practice they were not usually strong enough to do
so. Unit profit was greater at the end than at the beginning of
every expansion for which we have monthly data except 1911—13
and 1914—18, and lower at the end than at the beginning of every
contraction except 1920—21.
The rise in unit profit usual in expansions came about in various
ways in different cycles (Table 114). In three phases, revenue fell,
but cost declined more than enough to offset the fall in revenue;
profit therefore rose. This was the most common combination of
changes. In contraction the combination of changes in cost and
revenue that produced the usual fall in profit was more uniform.
profit
frequentlythe opposite of that in average 'price' received.
The foregoing remarks pertain to net revenue. But there was
practically no difference among the variants of profit in their308 CHAPTER 10
direction of change. En the first place net revenue itself, before
depreciation, always changed in the same direction as net revenue
after depreciation. The fluctuations in the other four variants
(operating income before and after, and net operating income
before and after) corresponded to those in net revenue. Whenever
any one of the 6 variants showed a net rise in any phase, so did all
the others. When one fell, the others fell (Table 115, col. I, V, IX).
This would necessarily be true if unit depreciation, taxes, and
operating rents were constant. They were not constant in fact, but
the changes in them were never important enough to upset the
harmony among the
Table 114
Revenue, Expense, and Net Revenue, per Traffic Unit










































1908—10 + ... + .... +
1911—13 — — — — —































1929—32 — — + — —
1926—27 — + + — —
1920—21 + + + + +
Derived from Tables 78, 97, and 115.
14 Inthe earlier phases we are certain of this only for the smaller number
of variants on which we have data. We have none on any variant before deprecia—
tion prior to 1911—13, and none on net operating income either before or after until
1918—19.COST AND PROFIT 309
Table 115
Profits per Traffic Unit





























































































































































































































































































































































Forexplanation of H and L see Table 97.
aNumeralsrefer to the various kinds of profit:
1 Net operating revenue before depreciation.
2 Operating income before depreciation.
3 Net operating income before depreciation.
4 Net operating revenue after depreciation.
5 Operating income after depreciation.
6 Net operating income after depreciation.
bProfitsfor June 1918 and August 1920 were recomputed on the basis of the hypo-
thetical cost figures described in Table 97, note b.
The 1914—18 and 1920—21 exceptions to the general rule that
unit profits show a net rise in expansion and fall in contraction are
largely if not entirely traceable to extraordinary dislocations
the national structure of prices.In 1914—18, when profits failed
(on net balance over the phase as a whole) to grow as usual with
traffic, prices of materials and supplies increased very rapidly
prices received for transportation services. In 1920—
21, when profits rose although traffic was contracting, prices paid
fell very swiftly relatively to prices received, at least during the
last two-thirds of the phase (Ch. 9).
It must be confessed that yearly figures before 1908 indicate,
on the whole, an inverse, not a positive, relation between unit
profit and traffic. The former declined in every phase from 1893
onward (Chart 116). The net fall in the contractions of 1893—95
and 1896—97 was less rapid than in the intervening expansion.
The decline in net revenue in 1896—97 was also less rapid than in
1897—1907, although net operating income fell more gradually in
the long expansions. Falling traffic did not bring a steeper down-
ward tilt in both forms of profit until 1907—08. (There are no data
on the intermediate form, operating income.)
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CHART 116
Operating Profits per Traffic Unit, 1890—1911
Cents
.36
Do profits begin to fall before expansion endsP
The fact that unit profits were higher at the end of an expansion
of traffic than at the beginning, as they usually were after 1907,
does not necessarily mean that they rose steadily throughout the
phase. They could increase for a while, then fall, yet not lose all
their initial advance. Likewise, a net decline during contraction is
quite compatible with some recovery during the later portion.
A downward trend in late expansion might be discouraging to
new investment even if it left profits higher than at the initial
trough. An upward trend late in contraction might be encouraging
even if it did not bring them back to their level at the preceding
peak. Despite our findings in the foregoing section we still have to
determine whether such reversals of direction were frequent.
The simplest way to answer this question would be to divide
the curve of unit profits into rising and falling phases by inspection
and compare the turning points that separate those phases with
the turns in traffic. When we try to do this, however, we encounter
difficulties, illustrated by the curve for net revenue after deprecia-
. -.
. - H,
sometime after W orid War I. There was a sharp but temporary
decline in profits in January 1918. Shall we deem this month the
foot of a Cyclical slope? From the transient character of the decline
.34
.32
Shaded periods are contractions Ln traffic units.CBART 117









Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units.COST AND PROFIT 313
we judge otherwise. Furthermore, we disregard the sharp down-
ward projection in June, which was largely a result of the retro-
active wage award, and a somewhat less sharp, transitory upward
thrust in July. We would mark off a trough in profits in 1919,
and a peak in the summer of that year, if the fluctuations in
neighboring parts of the curve were less hectic; but the rise from
March to July looks too mild in its actual surroundings. We accept
August 1920 as a trough month, although the extreme depth is
accounted for by another retroactive wage adjustment, because
the tendency was clearly downward in the months preceding it
and upward in those following. We ignore a sharp dip in 1922 be-
cause it was probably caused by the shopmen's strike, which
apparently raised unit operating costs, and pass over a deep nick
in February 1923. In consequence of the last two decisions we find
a cyclical decline runuing from July 1922 to October
We find an extra peak and trough early in the traffic expansion
of 1932—37, and might designate more in that vicinity, but the
resulting intervals would be shorter than those we customarily
recognize as specific phases. As we have observed elsewhere, there
were several fairly pronounced minor waves in traffic itself during
this phase; the sub-cycles in profits correspond to them rather
closely.
The curves for the other five variants, as far as we have data
for them, look so much like the one for net revenue after deprecia-
tion that it would be a waste of paper to reproduce them here.
As far as figures are available, the peaks and troughs in all six, as
determined by processes similar to those just described, were
usually identical. Around 1923 and again around 1928, there were
some differences in this respect, but every kind of profit was at
its highest some months before the peak in traffic. Around 1937,
on the other hand,thehighest points in three kinds coincided with
1-hp ee
earlier.
If we accept the rather precarious evidence of the turns, they
appear to support the view that unit profits begin to decline before
I JL
hasfallen to its most depressed level. In 10 of 12 instances (not
Notfrom March 1922. Our judges of these matters think the higher level in
month too isolated.314 CHAPTER 10
counting 1937) the turn in profit preceded the corresponding turn
in traffic; in 2 they coincided (Chart 118).
CHART118
Numberof Months by which Turn in Net Operating



































Derived from Chart 117.
If,however, we are distrustful of conclusions based on the loca-
tion of individual, perhaps arbitrarily chosen months,we may turn
our attention to averages for successive groups of months, as we
have done previously in considering similar problems.In three
highest level in the final stage of traffic growth (Table 115).
fourth phase, 1932—37, presents a problem of classification. Three
variants were highest in stage II, but, after declining to III,rose
to their second highest level in V. It would not be fair to say they
declined from II onward. The other three were highest at the end.
In each of the four earliest expansions, on the other hand,every
variant of profits was at its highest in some stage before the final
one. In three contractions, every variant was lowest at the end;
but in the other five, each came to its low point earlier.
On the other hand, rising profits were at least ascommon as
Turn in
Attroughs D,cD No lead or lag
11111










t No corresponding turn in profits.
0 +10
expansions all variants(except one in1921—23) attained their
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falling profits in every segment of expansion, and falling at least
as common as rising profits in every segment of contraction (Table
116, last two lines).
Falling profits did, however, occur somewhat more frequently
in the second than in the first, and in the third and fourth than in
the second segments of expansion. And rising profits were more
frequent in the later than in the earlier half of contraction.
Table 116
Profits per Traffic Unit
Direction of Change from Stage to Stage of Cycles in Traffic Units
Cycle I—Il Il—IllIII—IV IV—V V—VI VI—VilVIl—VillVill—IX
1908—li + + — — — — — +
1911—14 — — + — — — + —
1914—19 + + — — + — — —
1919—21 + + —t — — + + +
1921—24 + + — + — — + —
1924—27 + + + + — — + —
1927—32 + + ± + — — — —
1932—38 + — + + — — — +
Number+ 7 6 4 4 1 1 4 3
Number— 1 2 4 4 7 7 4 5
Derivedfrom Table 115.All known variants changed in the same direction, ex-
cept as noted.
f Net revenue before depreciation, +.
Weare more impressed by the analysis of stages than by the
turns.In the railroad industry at least, an ominous narrowing
of the profit margin while the physical volume of business is still
growing, and an auspicious widening while volume is still di-
minishing, were not highly characteristic of the cyclical course of
events. Yet even according to the stage averages, the maximum
level was reached before the end in more than half the expansions
if we leave the hard-to-interpret case of 1932—37 out of the count,
tile enit Ill
more than half of the contractions, although in some instances
the rise was not continuous after the low point. We never find a
continued widening of the profit margin akin
ora contmuea narrowing of the margin after traffic to in.-
crease. The maximum and minimum were sometimes early, never
late.316 CHAPTER 10
Mostrapid rise, or fall, came early
Although unit profits often grow even in late expansion and de-
cline even in late contraction, such changes might become pro-
gressively slower as a phase wears on. We found that operating
expense per traffic unit in the later segments of expansion com-
monly rose, or declined less rapidly than in the first or second, and
that in the later segments of contraction it commonly fell, or rose
less sharply than in the first. If unit gross receipts did not change,
exactly the opposite would be true of profit. It would usually
decline or rise less rapidly than before in the second segment of
expansion, increase or fall less rapidly in the second of contraction.
In later segments its behavior from cycle to cycle would be less
consistent, just as that of unit cost was. For net revenue is com-
puted by deducting operating expense from gross receipts. Fur-
thermore, since operating income and net operating income are
computed by making successive deductions from net revenue as a
starting point, alterations in the direction and rate of change in
unit expense must influence the direction and rate of change of
these variants of profit also. But, on these levels the course of unit
taxes and rents as well as that of unit gross revenue may modify
the inverse reflection of cost in profits.
But in fact the several variants of unit profit did not differ very
much with respect to their time of quickest change (Table 117).
In any one expansion, the segment of most rapid growth was the
same for all. In 1914—18, for example, it was the first, for all four
known variants; in 1921—23 it was the fourth, for all six. In each
contraction, except 1923—24 and 1937—38, the segment of most
rapid decline was the same for any one variant as for any other.
In most cases the highest rate of change occurred in the first or
second segment. All variants had their speediest rise during the
first segment in 5 expansions, and during the second in one. All
had their most abrupt decline during the first segment in 4 con-
tractions, during the second in one. In still another phase, 1937—
38, two declined most vigorously in the first segment, the others
in the second.
Since early rates of growth in expansion and of decline in con-
traction, when they occurred, were seldom exceeded later in the
same phase (they were never exactly equaled), their projectionTable 117
Profits per Traffic Unit
Change per Month during Segments of Cycles in Traffic Units
(Cents per month)




Segment of contraction Cycle and
kiix( of
profit First Second Third Fourth
1908—11
4 .0029 .0016 0002— .0017— .0064— .0013— .0006 .0039
5 .0032.0015 0002— .0017— .0073— .0009— .0009 .0036
1911—14
1 .0005— .0012 .0015 .0065— .0018— .0003.0015— .0005
2 .0006— .0014 .001,7 .0062— .0024— .0007 .0012— .0004
4 .0004— .0013 .0014— .0064— .0022— .0006 .0011— .0010
5 .0006— .00f5 .0017— .0062— .0028— .0011 .0008— .0008
1914—19


























5 0064 .0011— .0048— .0018 .0214— .0207 .0065— .0138
6 — .0019 .0246— .0223 .0065— .0146
1919-21
1 .0036 .0072 .0003— .0044— .0458 .0199 .0143 .0151
2 .0048 .0071 —.0022—.0038—.0476 .0192 .0122 .0130
3 .0050 .0057 —.0022—.0022—.0473 .0184 .0113 .0121
4 .0040 .0074 —.0001—.0035—.0465 .0197 .0127 .0145
5 .0052 .0073 —.0026—.0030—.0483 .0190 .0106 .0123
6 .0054 .0059 —.0025—.0013—.0481 .0182 .0097 .0114
1921—24
1 .0058 .0022— .0070 .0107— .0048— .0020 .0048— .0038
2 .0065 .0014— .0050 .0109— .0056— .0030 .0048— .0058
3 .0069 .0014— .0049 .0110— .0059— .0032.0049— .0065
4 .0060 .0022— .0063 .0113— .0055— .0028 .0046— .0051
s .0068 .0014— .0043 .0115— .0062— .0038.0047— .0071
6 .0072 .0014— .0042 .0116— .0065— .0041 .0047— .0077
1924—27
1 .0064 .0005 .0010 .0044— .0043— .0030 .0013— .0094
2 .0068 .0006 .0008 .0042 —.0042—.0031 .0012 —.0097
3 .0068 .0007 .0008.0041 —.0040—.0034 .0012 —.0100
4 .0066 .0005 .0010 .0046 —.0046—.0034 .0009 —.0098
5 .0070 :0006 .0008 .0044— .0045— .0034 .0008— .0101
6 .0070 .0006 .0008.0043— .0043— .0037 .0007— .0104
1927—32
1 .0091, .0041 .0003 .0010'— .0057— —.0022 .0003
2 .0091 .0036 .0008 —.0058— —.0033—.0010
3 .0089 .0038 .0008 .0007! —.0083— —
4 .0043.0004 .OOiO —.006ó—.0018—.0033—.0010






4 .0046' .0018 .0012 .0009'—.0109—.0093—.0031 .0113
5 .00631 .0011 .0009 .0011 —.0072—.0129—.0064 .0102
6 .0009 .0012 .0018 —.0074—.0139—
.0101
Computed from data in Table115.318 CHAPTER 10
into future would almost always have yielded an unduly
optimistic forecast of unit profits in stages IV and V, and an un-
duly pessimistic forecast in VII, VIII, and IX.
Table 118
Unit Profit: Summary of Change from Segment. to Segment of Phases
in Traffic Units
Number of expansions in which all known variants:
In second segment, fell, or rose less rapidly than in first 7
In third segment, fell, or rose less rapidly than in second
In fourth segment, fell, or rose less rapidly than in third
5
4a
Number of contractions in which all known variants:
In second segment, rose, or fell less rapidly than in first
In third segment, rose, or fell less rapidly than in second




Derived from Table 117.
aIneach of 2 other expansions, three of six variants increased less rapidly in the
fourth segment than in the third.
bIn1 other contraction, two of six variants fell less rapidly in the second than in
the first segment.
In 1 other contraction, one of the two known variants fell rapidly in the
third than in the second segment.
With few exceptions, the course of the variants, as far as it is
known, was similar during any two successive segments. Some-
times all rose in one and fell in the other.Sometimes all rose in
one and rose faster in the other.At other times all fell in one and
fell more rapidly in the other. We can therefore make a common
summary, dealing with a few departures in footnotes (Table 118).
In the second segment of seven expansions all variants of profit
per unit either fell or rose less rapidly than in the first, acting
otherwise in only one.A similar statement holds for the third as
compared with the second segment in five expansions, but for the
last as compared with the third in oniy four. In two additional
last segments, however, it holds for half of the variants. Declines
in unit profit and retardations of increase, considered jointly, were
therefore highly characteristic of the second stretch of expansion,
less common in the middle or toward the end. In 6 contractions,
rises or retardations of decline in profit occurred during the second
and third, segment. (For one or two variants, we find them in a
seventh phase.) They appeared in just half of the fourth segments.COST AND PROFIT 319
In a broad way, the changes in profit were the obverse of those in
costs. Rising costs and less rapidly falling costs, taken together,
falling and less rapidly rising profits, were not highly typical
features toward the end of expansion, but were more or less char-
acteristic of earlier segments, except of course the first. Falling
and less rapidly rising costs, rising and less rapidly falling profits,
were not especially common toward the end of contractions, but
were fairly prevalent in preceding segments, except the first.
In the last segment of expansion profits, like costs, bore little
resemblance to those in the immediately following segment of
contraction (Table 117). In the four cycles beginning with 1921—
24, every variety of profit rose in the former and fell in the latter.
In the 1908—il cycle, the two kinds of profit about which we have
any information declined from IV to V, but the decline quickened
from V to VI. In three-fourths of the cycles, then, the onset of
contraction meant either that rising were converted into falling
profits or that any decline already in progress was speeded up.
The transition from contraction to expansion was almost as
marked. We can observe it in only 7 instances. In 5 of the 7, the
advent of traffic expansion was promptly signalized by conversion
of falling into rising profits. In the other two instances, however,
there was a rise at the end of contraction, and it was not followed
by a more vigorous rise.
Comparisons between segments of reference cycles, which may
be equally appropriate to the questions considered in the preced-
ing three sections, lead to similar conclusions. The variant of unit
profit for which we have the longest record was higher in the final
than in the initial stage in 7 of 8 reference expansions, lower at the
trough than at the peak in 7 of 8 reference contractions. Rises
occurred rather consistently toward the beginning of expansions,
falls toward the beginning of contractions; we do not find either
fall,came early, although the majority of early maximum rises
in expansion is not impressive. The characteristic early change
tanered off or was reversed in a fair majority of second and third
segments, the did not porsist vc'y into
the fourth.320 CHAPTER 10
Table 119
Net Operating Revenue after Depreciation, per Traffic Unit
Changes during Segments of Reference Cycles
Segment of expansion Segment of contraction
FirstSecond Third FourthFirstSecond Third Fourth
Number of cycles for which8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9
data are available
Number in which unit profit:
Fell 1 2 3 4 8 6 4 5
Didnot change 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0
Rose 7 6 3 4 0 2 4 4
Rosemore rapidly than in4 1 0 3 ....
anyother segment of same
expansion
Fell more rapidly than in any 6 1 0 1
other segment of same con-
traction t
Fell, or rose less rapidly than 7 6 4
in preceding segment of
same expansion
Rose, or fell less rapidly than.. .. . 7t 8 5
in preceding segment of
same contraction
fSincethere are no data on the first segment of the 1907—08 contraction, only
eight, not nine, comparisons are possible.
Greatest change in proportion to traffic came early
Instead of dividing the change in unit profit from stage to stage
by the number of months elapsed, as we did in the preceding
section, we can divide it by the increase in traffic. For example, we
can divide the rise in net revenue per traffic unit after depreciation
during the first segment of the 1908—11 cycle, .0116 cents, by the
increase in traffic, 1.39 billion traffic units; we thus find that
profit rose .0083 cents for each billion-unit increment of traffic.
The results of such calculations, for a series of segments, tell us
whether the improvement in profit during a cyclical upswing in
traffic became smaller, in proportion to the growth of traffic, as
the expansion got older; and whether the deterioration in profit
during a downswing became smaller, in proportion to the loss of
traffic, as the contraction developed.
As before, we find that the most striking change usually oc-
curred in the earlier segments (Table 120). The growth of unit
profit per billion-unit gain in traffic was greatest during the first
segment in 4 expansions, during the second in 2, during the firstTable 120
Change in Unit Profit duringEachSegment of Cycles in Traffic Units
Divided by Change in Traffic Units
(Cents)
______________________________
Cycle, & Segment of expansion Segment of contraction
kind of
_________________________ ________ ____________________________________
profita First Second Third Fourth First Second ThirdFourth
1908—11
4 .0083 .0090 —.0006—.0057—.0326—.0077—.0525 .0236
5 .0093 .0086 —.0006—.0058—.0374 .0055 —.0750.0218
1911—14
1 —.0070—.0089 .0045 —.0115—.0051—.0019 .0066 —.0017
2 —.0093—.0103 .0053 —.0110 —.0068 —.0050 .0053 —.0012
4 —.0063 .0092 .0043 —.0114—.0064—.0044 .0050 —.0031
5 —.0085—.0106 .0051 —.0109—.0082—.0076 .0037 —.0026
1914—19
1 .0130 .0026 —.0150—.0037 .0196 —.0307—.0104—.0091
2 .0134 .0027 —.0153—.0030 .0185 —.0314—.0104—.0107
3 No data —.0032 .0213 —.0338—.0104—.0114
4 .0134 .0028 —.0149—.0033 .0191 —.0316—.0113—.0099
5 .0137 .0029 —.0151—.0027 .0180 —.0322—.0112—.0115
6 No data —.0028 .0207 —.0347—.0112—.0122
19 19—21
1 .0043 .0102
b— .0023—.07231.3675 .0084 .0317
2 .0057 .0102
b— .0020—.07521.3212 .0071 .0273
3 .0060 .0080
b— .0011—.07471.2650 .0066 .0253
4 .0048 .0105
b— .0019—.07351.3538 .0074 .0303
5 .0063 .0104
b— .0016—.07631.3075 .0062 .0258
6 .0065 .0083
b— .0007—.07591,2512 .0056 .0238
1921—24
1 .0176 .0278 —.0069 .0097 —.0086—.0027 C— .0036
2 .0198 .0173 —.0050 .0100 —.0099—.0042 c— .0055
3 .0211 .0176 —.0048 .0101 —.0105—.0044 —.0061
4 .0185 .0286 —.0062 .0103 —.0097—.0038 —.0048
5 .0208 .0178 —.0042 .0105 —.0111—.0053
C— .0067
6 .0221 .0184 —.0041 .0106 —.0116—.0056 —.0073
1924—27
1 .0142 .0028 .0045 .0109 —.0361—.0146 .0041 —.0256
2 .0151 .0034 .0036 .0106 —.0350—.0148 .0038 —.0265
3 .0151 .0036 .0035 .0103 —.0333—.0163 .0036 —.0272
4 .0146 .0027 .0048 .0114 —.0386 .0164.0028 —.0267
5 .0155 .0032 .0039 .0111 —.0372—.0166 .0025 —.0276
6 .0155 .0034 .0039 .0108 —.0358—.0181 .0023 —.0284
1927—32
1 .0357 .0334.0330'—.0389—.0318 .0C35
2 .0357 .0134 .0085 .0242 —.0091 .0026 —.0046—.0017
3 .0351 .0142 .0080 .0217 —.0099— —
4 .036/ .0162 .0038 —.0101—.0031—.0046—.0016
5 .0367 .0142 .0089,.0233 —.0103—.0038—.0062 — .0038
6




3 .0168'— .0023 —.0138' .0287
4 —.01411 .0015 —.0237—.0104—.0032.0298
5 .01931—.0082 .00301.0019 —.0156—.0145—.0064 .0269
6 .0208! — .00381 —.0161—.0155—.0076.0265




or second (depending on the variant considered) in 2. The fall in
profit per billion units of traffic lost was most severe during the
first segment of 6 contractions, the second of 1.
Falls and diminishing rises were a trifle, but perhaps not ap-
preciably, more common in the second than in later segments of
expansion (Table 121). Rises and diminishing falls were somewhat
more frequent in the second segment of contraction than in the
third, and in the third than in the fourth.
Table 121
Unit Profit: Change per Billion-unit Change in Traffic
Summary of Comparisons between Segments of Cycles in Traffic Units
Number of expansions in which change in all known variants of unit profit, per
billion-unit increase of traffic:
In second segment, was a fall, or a smaller rise .than in the first 5 (of 8)a
In third segment, was a fall, or a smaller rise than in the second 4 (of 7)b
Infourth segment, was a fall, or a smaller rise than in the third 4 (of 7)
Number of contractions in which change in all known variants of unit profit,
per billion-unit decrease of traffic:
In second segment, was a rise, or a smaller fall than in first 7 (of 8)
In third segment, was a rise, or a smaller fall than in second 5 (of 7)
In fourth segment, was a rise, or a smaller fall than in third 4 (of 7)o
Derived from Table 120.
a In another expansion, 1 of 2 variants, and in still another 4 of 6 rose less in the
second segment than in the first.
bInone other expansion, 1 of 6 variants rose less in the third segment than in the
second.
In one other contraction, 2 of 6 variants declined less in the fourth segment than
in the third.
Inflexible deductions intensified the typical fluctuations of unit profit
Although the direction of change over a whole phase or the relative
rates of change in different segments are rather similar no matter
what variant of unit profits we consider, as the foregoing sections
indicate, the deduction of depreciation, taxes, and rents did have
marked and consistent effects on the amplitude of fluctuations in
profit.
In all the traffic expansions after 1908 in which profits increased,
each kind of unit deduction, as far as we can tell from the available
data, usually either declined or increased by a smaller percentage.
than the variant of profit from which it is deductible (Table 122).
Depreciation always fell; taxes never rose as much as net operating
revenue; rents never as much as operating income, except in 1919—Deductions and Profits, per Traffic Unit; and Traffic Units
Percentage Net Change during Phases of Cycles in Traffic Units, 1908—1938
EquipmentNet operating revenue Operating income Net operating income
DepreciationTaxes and i9int Traffic
facility Before After Before After Before After units Z
rents depreciationdepreciationdepreciationdepreciationdepreciationdepreciation




1908-10 —1.9 f t 5.7 t 6.8 t t 26.1
1919—20 —6.7 12.6 15.0 14.1 17.9 14.6 20.1 14.4 20.3 21.2
1921—23 —22.4 —15.1 —15.7 11.6 16.7 20.6 29.9 24.4 35.8 40.3
1924—26 —5.3 —0.4 —1.4 18.9 22.3 24.8 30.4 27.0 33.7 18.7
1927—29 —5.4 1.2 —1.3 19.3 23.1 24.8 -31.0 27.3 34.9 8.3
1932—37 —44.3—25.9 —39.4 2.3 16.8 15.8 48.1 31.1 92.0 80.2
Decreased
1911—13 3.1 —3.1 t —9.2 —9.9 —10.1 —10.9 t f 22.2




1910—11 f 6.6 t t —4.2 t —5.6 t t —4.8
1913—14 52.4 22.2 f —0.2 —3.9 —3.4 —7.0 t f —15.6
1918-19 30.0 21.7 0.0 —23.0 —28.3 —31.2 —38.5 —32.5 —40.4 —18.7
1923—24 29.8 17.9 18.1 —2.7 —6.0 —7.6 —12.5 —9.5 —14.9 —15.1
1926—27 17.3 1.7 10.4 —13.2 —16.5 —16.9 —21.6 —18.9 —24.3 —9.7
1929—32 85.1 35.7 105.6 —18.2 —30.2 —31.2 —48.5 —41.9 —62.6 —52.3
1937—38 43.8 31.1 37.2 —10.9 —19.1 —23.7 —37.4 —31.4 —49.1—27.9
Increased
1920—21 56.6 55.9 128.3 47.9 46.7 45.3 43.0 40.2 36.6—28.7
f Not available.324 CHAPTER 10
20, when they rose a trifle more than operating income before
depreciation. In all contractions, every kind of deduction in-
creased, except rents in 1918—19, which did not change, unlike
operating income, which fell. In consequence, whenever one
variant changed in the typical direction (up in contractions,
down in expansions of traffic), any variant computed by subtract-
ing a deduction from it changed in the same direction by a larger
percentage. Profit after depreciation was more variable than
profit before it; compare column 5 with 4, 7 with 6, 9 with 8.
Profit after taxes was more variable than profit before taxes;
compare colunm 6 with 4, 7 with 5. Profit after rents was more
variable than profit before rentscompare column 8 with 6, 9
with 7.
Table 123
Taxes and Profits, per Traffic Unit; and Traffic Units
Percentage Net Change during Phases of Cycles in Traffic Units,
1893—1908
Taxes Net operating Net operating Traffic units revenue income
Expansions
1895—96 —10.21 —2.49 —1.58 10.62
1897—1907 —26.36 —6.55 —4.06 143.35
Contractions
1893—95 21.53 —0.68 —2.82 —10.38
1896—97 10.37 —0.37 —1.53 —1.65
1907—08 12.35 —8.63 —12.94 —4.92
In the contractions before 1908, the same rules hold for the one
deduction and two variants on which we have data (Table 123).
Unit profit before taxes declined, as it typically did after 1908,
taxes increased, and operating income therefore fell by a larger
percentage than net operating revenue. In the expansions profit
before taxes decined—not the typical change in later experience;
there was no rise for the fall in unit taxes to accentuate.
Physical relations usually more important than price
Unit net operating revenue depends on price relations on the one
hand and productivity relations on the other. If we let r stand for
16Exceptthat in 1919—20 net operating income before depreciation did not rise
as much as operating income before depreciation.COST AND PROFIT 325
unit revenue arid use other symbols in the same way as we did in
discussing cost, then unit net revenue equals
q2
Ifthe p's usually rise substantially while r does not rise very much
or even falls, then the price relations change in a way that tends
to increase the size of the subtracted items and hence to reduce
profit. If the quantities of labor and materials do not rise in pro-
portion to traffic, the q/t ratios tend to fall, the size of the item
subtracted tends to fall, and profits tend to rise. Conversely, a
fall in the p's relatively to r tends to improve profits and a larger
fall in traffic than in quantities of labor and materials tends to
reduce them. Prices paid usually rose relatively to r in expansion,
although it is not clear that they fell relatively in contraction
(Ch. 9). As noted in the discussion of costs, productivity probably
improved in expansion, lowering the q/t's, and fell in contraction,
raising them. Apparently the changes in physical relations were
usually more important than those in price relations when traffic
was growing, since unit profit rose in most expansions. Since it fell
in all contractions except one, either price relations, like physical
relations, altered in a manner adverse to profits, or did not change
enough to offset the change in the latter.
In two of the three exceptional phases, the disturbances in
prices, which apparently prevailed over changes in unit consump-
tion of materials and services, were extremely severe. In 1914—18,
when sellers of commodities increased their prices so rapidly and
no corresponding changes were made in fares or freight rates, unit
profit declined, although the productivity of labor, at least, in-
creased (Table 53), In1920—21,when commodity prices were so
abruptlydc€ated rai'way wage rates were up-
ward)and rates and fares increased, unit profit rose in spite of
higher unit fuel consumption (Charts 93 and 94) and at least a
slight decline in the productivity of labor. In the 1911—13
pansion, however, the dislocation of prices cannot have been very
Aggregate sometimes continued to rise or decline after turn in unit
profit
Since total profits are the product of unit profits and volume, a
decline in the former does not necessarily mean that the growth of326 CHAPTER 10
aggregate net earnings has ended. In an expansion, the growth of
traffic tends to re-enforce the effect of rising but to counteract that
of falling unit profit. Even though unit earnings begin to fall
before the end of the phase, continued rise in traffic, if large
enough relatively to that fall, will cause aggregate profits to
increase. In a contraction, continued decline of traffic may cause
total profit to go on declining even after unit profit has turned
upward. This has often happened. Net revenue after depreciation
will illustrate the point (Chart 119) •17In4 of 13 cases, aggregate
profits did not reach their peak until several months after the high
point in unit profits. In 8, however, the turns coincided. The turn
in aggregate only once preceded that in unit earnings.
CHART 119
Number of Months by which Turn in
Aggregate Net Operating Revenue Pre-
ceded (—)orFollowed (+) Turn in
Net Operating Revenue Per Traffic Unit
Turnin net peaksE:.:I.:.At troughs
















Feb. 1938iii liii iiii11111 I
—10 0 +10 +20
Number of months
Acomparison of averages for successive stages indicates some-
what more divergence. In 7 of 16 instances, the highest stage in
aggregate came later than the highest in unit net revenue, or the
lowest in the former came later than the lowest in the latter
(Table 125). In the other 9 instances the stages coincided.
Even'when the highest or the lowest stages failed to coincide,
unit and aggregate net did not always move in opposite directions
17The2 extra turns in 1933 and 1934 are not shown. In both, the aggregate lagged
by one month.COST AND PROFIT 327
in the interval. They moved in the same direction in every segment
of the 1919—20 expansion, but the rise in unit net revenue during
the fourth segment was insufficient to offset the decline during the
third, while the rise in aggregate net was more than sufficient.
Consequently, the former had its peak in stage III, the latter in V.
Table 124
Aggregate Net Operating Revenue after Depreciation
Averages for Stages of Cycles in Traffic Units
(Millions of dollars)
Cycle I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
1908—1158.865.271.477.01178.4 73.870.9L70.2 71.5
1911—14 71.571.871.81181.2 78.8 72.6 68.9 67.8L63.8
1914—19 63.885.4103.9 91.2 94.lfH108.lf78.9 67.5L55.1
1919—21 55.160.474.8 76.11177.9 L15.3 60.7f 71.0 81.9
1921—24 81.993.499.8103.711134.1 124.1109.4 119.9L107.0
1924—27107.0124.7131.2140.2H155.3 147.8135.9 132.6L117.1
1927—32117.1133.2151.0154.111156.1 124.9 96.8 63.9L52.3
1932—38 52.370.368.489.811109.4 96.0 71.9L57.9 63.7
H indicates a high, L a low stage.Level of any stage not marked (except I,
which is ignored because it is identical with IX of preceding cycle) is intermediate.
t Profits for June 1918 and August 1920 recomputed on basis of hypothetical cost
figures; see Table 97, note b.
Table 125
Unit and Aggregate Net Operating Revenue after Depreciation
High and Low Stages, 1908-1938
Level of profit
Stage in which level was reached No. of stages
by which (2)
































































Effect of inflexible items on aggregate profit.s
The inflexibility of depreciation charges, taxes, and rents neces-
sarily accentuated the typical cyclical fluctuations in aggregate
profits as well as those in unit profits. The typical change in the
aggregate figures, as in the case of earnings per traffic unit, was a
rise in expansion and a fall in contraction. Indeed, this was more
consistently true of aggregate profits, as total earnings of every
kind for which we have data grew in all expansions of traffic,
including those before 1908, although unit earnings fell in four.
Except in 1911—13, aggregate profit of every kind after deprecia-
tion increased more than profit of the same kind before it. Com-
pare column 2 of Table 126 with 1, 4 with 3, or 6 with 5. The con-
trast between income before and income after taxes is almost as
clear, if we examine profits after depreciation, for which we have
a longer record. In 8 of 10 expansions, including those before 1908,
earnings after both depreciation and taxes increased by a larger
percentage than earningsafter depreciation only. Compare
column 4 with 2 and the second column of Table 127 with the first.
In 1919—20, one of these eight, there was no appreciable difference
between net operating income and net operating revenue, both
1889 -- '92'94'96'981900
Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units.COST AND PROFIT 329
taken before depreciation. Compare column 3 with 1. In that
phase the changes in profits before and after rents were likewise
about equal. But in the few other phases for which we have data,
net operating income, because of inflexible rents, rose more than
operating income. Compare column 5 with 3 or 6 with 4. In all
contractions except 1920—21 (in which the changes were not
typical in direction), the percentage decline in each derived variant
was larger than that in any variant prior to it.
Table 126
Aggregate Profits: Percentage Net Change during Phases of Cycles in
Traffic Units, 1908—1938

























































































































































Earnings from operations not the only factor in companies' profits
In addition to their profits from carrying goods and passengers,
the railroad companies derive income from other sources, such as
operation of nontransport enterprises or ownership of stocks and
bonds. From their gross receipts they must make deductions, not
oniy for the expenses, taxes, and rents which have been discussed,
but on other accounts, such as interest on indebtedness. The
amounts available for distribution to stockholders or improvement
of their equity are not determined solely by the net earnings from
the conduct of a railway business. Receipts from other quarters
must be added, and from the resulting total various items must be
subtracted, to arrive at what accountants call the net income of
the corporations.
Fixed charges left a highly variable residual
The largest items in the accounting transition from net railway
operating income to net income are two deductions—rent for
leased roads and interest. Their size is fixed, for the most part, by
contracts with lessors and bondholders, running for many years;
it is not affected much by changes from one year to the next in
traffic or operating profits. Consequently, the average burden of
fixed charges imposed on the revenue from a unit of service per-
formed usually became heavier in contractions, lighter in ex-
pansions (Chart 121) •18Sinceunit net operating income ordinarily
varied directly, and unit deductions inversely with traffic, one
might expect that net income per traffic unit would also rise and
fall with traffic.
18Datapertain to all opera.ting roads 1890—1911, Class I line-haul 1911—41. To
compute net income for operating roads only we had to tabulate their receipts
from other sources from data for individual companies, 1890—1907. Table Ill-B
in Statistics of Railways for those years shows income from lease of road, stocks,
bonds, and miscellaneous for every road, including strictly lessor companies, in
column 23, and the proportion of such income to all earnings and income, in column
24. We assumed that any road for which the proportion was under 100 percent was
an operating road. The totals obtained for all such roads were added to 'earnings
from operation'; total operating expenses and fixed charges of operating roads were
then deducted to get net income.COST AND PEOFIT 331
CHART 121






Shaded periods are contractions in traffic units.
Inthe war period, however, the expectation does not hold, for
the customary link between operations and profits was broken.
Class I railroads, with a few minor exceptions, were operated for
the account of the federal government, and most of such net
operating income as there was accrued to it. Whether current
operating profits were high or low, the companies received for
the use of their properties a 'standard return' equal, with some
modifications, to previous average earnings from operation. This
arrangement prevailed through the first two months of 1920 also.
During the next six, although the companies were again in charge
of their lines, the government promised to pay them the amount
by which their current profits might fall short of one-half the
standard annual return. Actual earnings were far below it, and
they collected about $600,000,000 under the guarantee. In these
three years, a fairly stable income from the government largely
replaced net operating income in the corporate accounts (Table
128). The substitution affected the net change in the ratio of






also in 1915—18 and 1920—21. Net income per unit did not rise and
fall with traffic in these phases and would not have done so even if
the usual positive relation between traffic and operating profits
had existed.
Table 128













760 Net railway operating incomes
Income from lease of roadb 4 893 912165 28 6
Miscellaneous income c 2 14 16602 38 1
Dividend income
Net income
123 92 90109 162 134
593 387 447431 314 370
Class I line-haul companies.Includes accounts of roads not controlled by Rail-
road Administration.
a Since these are corporate accounts, they do not include net railway operating
income accruing to the government in 1918, 1919, and the first two months of
1920.It was negative in 1918 and 1919 because corporations whose properties
were taken over continued to have some expenses and taxes of their own, and even,
for some mysterious reason, a small balance of equipment and joint facility rents
payable.
bIncludesstandard return paid by government for period of federal operation.
CIncludesamounts due or received on account of federal guarantee of earnings
under private operation, March—August 1920."It should be noted that although,
under our accounting rules, the income estimated as necessary to make good the
guarantee is accruable as miscellaneous income, many of the carriers so accrued
only the actual advances received ... " (Statisticsof Railways, 1920, p. XL).
Further settlements probably account for the somewhat abnormal level of this
account in 1921.
In 10 of the 15 other phases, however, there was a net rise when
traffic expanded and a net fall when it contracted (Chart 121).
The 5 exceptions were 1907—08, 1908—13, 1921—23, 1923—24, and
1926—28. The rise in 1923—24 was less rapid than in the following
expansion. The net increase in 1926—28 was less than in 1924—26 or
1928—29. Traffic was oniy a little larger in 1927 than in 1928;
if we had called the earlier year the trough, there would have been
no exception, for unit net income fell in 1926—27, rose in 1927—29.
It is fair to say that the relation between traffic and unit net in-
come was positive, although it was not as close as the inverse
relation between traffic and fixed charges. The difference in
regularity arose largely from imperfections in the positive relation
of unit operating profit to traffic.COST AND PROFIT 333
CHART 122
Ratio of Net Income to Net Operating Income, 1890—1941
While aggregate net income was more variable, with fair con-
sistency, than traffic, it was more variable than operating profit
with greater consistency. Since the principal items affecting cor-
porate earnings are fluctuating operating profits on the one hand
and stable fixed charges on the other, the deduction of rents and
interest, along with minor additions and subtractions, should
cause aggregate net income to rise and fall by larger percentages
than aggregate net operating income during phases of the latter.
Again this relation cannot be expected to hold good in phases
affected by the war arrangements—in this case a contraction
from 1916 to 1920 and an expansion from 1920 to In the
latter, the standard return affected only the initial year; the rest
19Inthe combined net operating income of the Railroad Administration and the
corporations, not the corporate figure in Table 128.
The 1919—20 expansion drops out of sight in annual data.334 CHAPTER 10
of the phase does show an (irregularly) rising ratio of net income
to net operating income, as do all the other expansions. Except
from 1916 to 1920, the ratio fell—i.e., net declined by a larger
percentage than net operating income—in all contractions of the
latter except 1907—08 (Chart 122).20
Returnon net worth rose and fell with traffic
In judging the profitability of a business, managers and stock-
holders are likely to consider not oniy the aggregate net income
but also its relation to the money invested in the enterprise. If
the return at the beginning of an expansion was 3 percent of the
net assets and the latter were subsequently doubled, aggregate
corporate profits 20 percent higher than at the beginning would
amount to oniy 1.8 percent of the enlarged investment, hardly an
attractive rate of return on venture capital. It is therefore of in-
terest to examine the rate of return as well as aggregate or unit
corporate earnings.
In the railroad industry, however, net investment is not likely to
change rapidly. Most of the assets consist of plant and equip-
ment, which take time to build and, once constructed, have long
actual or potential usefulness. Most of the liabilities are similarly
inflexible. Long-term bonded indebtedness is important. The
depreciation reserve, another deduction from assets, changes
slowly and is more or less independent of traffic. Consequently,
net worth, the difference between assets and liabilities, also
changes gradually. Profits grew faster than net investment in
traffic expansions, and shrank more rapidly in contractions, for
the rate of return on net worth usually increased in the former,
diminished in the latter (Chart 123) •21Themovement of the curve
20Alloperating roads 1890—1911, Class I line-haul 1911—42.
21Wehave computed net worth from balance sheet data. For the 1911—42 segment,
long-term debt, current liabilities, deferred liabilities, unadjusted credits
(including reserve for depreciation) were deducted from total assets. For 1890—1912
capital stock and profit and loss were added. It would have required enormous
labor to obtain separate figures for operating roads, 1890-1907, but it seems likely
that the ratio for them would vary in the same manner as that shown. For con-
sistency the earnings figures used include the net income of nonoperating roads
and differ in this respect from the net income used in computing data for Charts
121 and 122.
The net worth figure we use for any year is the average of figures for the begin-
ning and end of the year. We had to estimate the Class I figure for the beginning ofCOST AND PROFIT 335.
from 1917 through 1921 should be ignored because of the unusual
conditions previously described
CHART123
Percentage Ratio of Net Income to Net Worth, 1890—1941
Pe
1910—11;it was assumed to bear the same propoition to the figure for 'operating
and lessor' companies as prevailed at the end.
The basic statistics on assets and liabilities are imperfect. Those used for the
first segment are incomplete—some roads are omitted. Railway capital accounting
was sometimes loose or fraudulent in the early years; the results persisted, to a
diminishing degree, in later balance sheets. Depreciation charges were small. The
net worth does not accurately represent the dollars actually invested minus the
amounts actually advanced by creditors and minus a reasonable depreciation
charge. It seems unlikely, however, that truer data would show much greater
variability from year to year than those we are obliged to use. Our main point is
therefore not affected by the crudity of the accounts.
Perhaps it is unnecessary to add that the 'rate of return' discussed here differs in
concept from that which appropriately figures in regulatory proceedings where the
fairness or adequacy of the return on investment devoted to transportation only,
whether financed by borrowing or otherwise, is in question.
22Therate of return was even more closely related to cycles in net income itself.
Even outside of the period 1917—21, net income and traffic sometimes changed in
opposite directions; for example, from 1003 to 1004 or 1927 to 1928. But net income
and its ratio to net worth rose and fell together year by year, except from 1923 to
1924, even in the war period. Whenever corporate profit increased, net assets did
not accumulate as fast; whenever it fell, they did not, with the one exception,
diminish as fast.





Growing net income enhances the prospect of cash distributions
to stockholders; diminishing net curtails it. In good years, how-
ever, directors often fail to pay all current earnings out; in lean
years, they sometimes draw upon assets previously built up to
maintain disbursements to the equity owners. Yet variations in
net income are reflected, by and large, in dividends, although this
may not be obvious at once from the annual data to which we are
confined (Chart 124). Broadly speaking, from 1893 to 1938 each
expansion or contraction of profits can be paired with a similar
change in payments. To do this we must sometimes match a phase
of the former with a phase of the latter beginning and/or ending a
year later. For example, we regard the dividend contraction of
1908—09 as corresponding to the income contraction of 1907—09,
the dividend expansion of 1935—37 to the income expansion of
1934—36. In some instances the phase of disbursements we assign
to an expansion of profits occurred entirely in subsequent years
when earnings were contracting. Thus we think of the 1913—14








Dividends less variable than corporate earningsCOST AND PROFIT 337
pansion of net income. In one case we meet a similar problem in
trying to match contractions; we solve it by pairing the 1934—35
decline in payments with the 1933—34 decline in profits.
The 1903—04 and 1926—27 contractions, it is true, have no an-
alogues in payments. But the trough of net income in 1904 was
well above that in 1897, the peak in 1903 below that in 1907.
Likewise 1927 was higher than 1921 and 1926 lower than 1929.
We can think of 1897—1907 and 1921—29 as continuous if some-
what irregular expansions in profits, and link them with 1897—1908
and 1922—30 in dividends.
In one brief period, on the other hand, we are unable to make
out any kind of correspondence. If we regard either the slight
1919—20 or the somewhat larger 1921—22 fall in dividends as a
response to the 1919—21 contraction of earnings, we are still left
with two phases in payments to stockholders neither of which has
any equivalent in net income.
We find 20 instances of corresponding peaks or corresponding
troughs. In 11 the turn in dividends appears one year later than
that in earnings; in the other 9 they Frequent lags are
to be expected. Directors usually meet at regular intervals to
declare (or omit) dividends. Profits may reverse their direction
considerably before the customary occasion for recognizing any
change. Income for a period cannot be computed until the ac-
counts are closed; action based on full information is not possible
until early in the next period. Many directors no doubt follow a
policy of withholding payments in good times to preserve their
regularity in bad times, but may later abandon that objective if
profits fall off severely. The expansion in dividends resulting from
a short expansion in income may easily be thrown over into the
following contraction of income. Quarterly data, however, would
prol ably reveal a closer correspondence in time.
-- - ..— (.1
-- .'-. .4____ ——
ofnet income to decline relatively to net operating income in that
contraction. Dividends received (chiefly from other roads) are
the largest single addition to operating income in the computation
corporate iincome dividends from 1907
23Wepair the 1922 rather than the 1920 low point in dividends with the 1921 low
in income; if we choose 1920 instead, we have 10 lags, 1 lead.338 CHAPTER 10
to 1908, then fell to 1909.If they had been curtailed promptly,
net income might have fallen more than net operating income.
CHART
Ratio of Dividends to Net Income, 1890—1931
Ratio
2.50
Partly,at least, because of the lag, dividends have not risen or
fallen by as large a percentage as net income during expansions
and contractions in the latter. From 1892 to 1929 there was a net
decline in the ratio of payments to profits in every expansion, a
net increase in every contraction (Chart 125). Although net in-
come finally became a net deficit, for all roads taken together,
in 1929—32 and 1936—38, disbursements to stockholders were still
made, in reduced quantities (line (7) and (8) of Table 129). A
reduction of the deficit from $139 million in 1932 to $6 million in
1933 was accompanied by an increase of oniy $3 million in divi-
dends, a deepening of the deficit in 1934 by larger dividend pay-
ments. From 1934 to 1935 payments to owners were reduced
although the deficit became a surplus. As the improvement
continued, the ratio fell from the extremely high figure of 16.75







Shaded periods are contractions in net income.Roads Having Negative Net Income but Making Dividend Appropriations
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idend fig :es exclude dividends, include appropriations from income and from surplus. The latter distinction has little
meaning. Soi e roads car y all netincome to and makeall dividend appropriations from surplus.
aNoroads wh negative made appropriations.
bIncludes 'presenting an adjustment of appropriations from income in the previous year" by one road.
Not compusigns of income and dividends differ.
dIfthe road ientionednote b had reported $8,148,000 less dividends in 1931 instead of making an adjustment in 1932, data for it
would not be ucludedin (3), (1), or (5) for 1931, as they are above. This ratio would be .357 for 1931 and .183 for 1932.340 - CHAPTER10
Thedata for most of the depression years may suggest that
railroads paid dividends even when they were losing money. This
was true only in part. The deficit is an algebraic total in which the
profits of some roads are masked by the losses of others. Com-
panies with deficits contributed a very small percentage of all
dividends. Some companies, with positive income, appropriated
for dividends larger sums than they earned. Even when appropria-
tions of the first group are combined with excess appropriations
of the second, the fraction of all dividends accounted for is minor.
Most dividends were earned in every year, although the unearned
portion was as high as 36 percent in 1931.